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Changes to the country’s health care political landscape in 2012 resulted in the 
development of federal programs aimed at containing costs and improving the quality of 
care delivered. Accountable Care Organizations (ACO) emerged linking performance to 
rewards. Guided by Conrad’s value-based performance incentive theory as the theoretical 
foundation, the purpose of this quantitative study was to determine the relationship 
between financial incentive size and ACO performance measures. The research questions 
examined the predictive relationship of incentive size and acute care readmission rates, 
emergency department (ED) visits, and per capita spending of the ACO Medicare Shared 
Savings Program population. The study included 348 participating ACOs serving 7.8 
million Medicare enrollees. Secondary archival data were analyzed using multiple linear 
regression models to test the relationship patterns of the three dependent variables. The 
findings showed a significant association between incentive size and acute readmission 
rates β = .001; 95% CI, .000185, .001342; p = .010; and a significant inverse association 
with per capita spending, β = -6.28E
-7
; 95% CI, -.000001, -1.61E
-7
; p = .009, but no 
association with the frequency of ED visits β = -5.06E
-6
; 95% CI, -.000011, 7.04E
-7
; p = 
.085. The study results support that incentive size is linked with higher acute care 
readmission rate and lower per capita spending but not frequency of ED visits. Incentive 
size was found to be associated with better and worse ACO provider performance 
depending on the outcome. Social change implications include improved performance on 
ACO spending, which might potentially lead to political and regulatory changes 
supporting larger financial incentives by the federal government.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
Introduction 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) is the comprehensive health care reform law 
passed in March 2010 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, n.d.). The ACA had 
three goals: to provide affordable health insurance to more people, expand the Medicaid 
program, and support innovative medical care delivery to lower the costs of health care 
(CMS, n.d.). With the passing of the ACA, the payment structure in the delivery of health 
care evolved, and alternative payment models (APMs) surfaced as a result. One goal of 
the APMs is to improve the quality of care through the use of financial incentives as a 
method to influence and motivate health care providers and organizations (Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid [CMS], 2015). APMs are a mechanism to improve ACO 
performance, focusing on improved quality of care, controlled resource spending or 
utilization, and improved population health through a team approach of treatment and 
services (CMS, 2017). APMs support universal quality, standardized, clinical decision-
making, increasing the likelihood of continuity of services and improving 
collaboratively-delivered comprehensive care (DeCamp et al., 2014; Salisbury-Afshar, 
2012).  
These models were first applied to Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) 
through CMS in 2012. ACOs are groups of doctors, hospitals, and other health care 
providers who voluntarily come together to provide quality care to Medicare patients 
through a collaboration of provider care (CMS, 2017a). These programs focus on quality 




2017a).  Financial incentives were implemented under the ACA as a means to motivate 
and to guide provider treatment behavior with regard to the employment and analysis of 
care delivery (CMS, 2015b; CMS, 2017a). The impact of financial incentives on provider 
behavior lacks quantitative support (Khullar et al., 2015; Peterson, Woodard, Urech, 
Daw, & Sookman, 2006; Salisbury-Afshar, 2012; Werner et al., 2011). Revising the 
financial incentive size may initiate changes in a practitioner’s medical decision-making 
processes, which could, in turn, lead to improved quality, coordinated care, efficient 
resource usage, and cost containment or savings (Khullar et al. 2015).  
Systematic predictions supported by behavioral economics imply that provider 
treatment behavior and medical decision-making potentially contribute to the quality of 
care and the provider’s/organization’s performance is dependent on various provider-
specific factors (Conrad, 2015; Conrad & Perry, 2009). Characteristics applied by 
behavioral economics, show a variety of factors contributing to the behavior of the 
incentive (Conrad, 2015).  For example, the financial incentive success is impacted by 
distribution delays in payment, the frequency of incentive paid out, the incentive size or 
how it is delegated to ACO administration and providers, and which quality measures are 
utilized to determine the incentive specifically; all leading to the question if quality 
measures of care are a direct result of provider behavior as opposed to consumer behavior 
(Khullar et al, 2015). Khullar et al. (2015) indicated that incentives with smaller more 
frequent payments are more motivating than a lump sum. Health care providers adapt a 
personal medical decision-making process when approaching patient care. This variable 




commonly referred to as performance risks in the field (Conrad, 2015). These clinical 
processes link the diversity in medical training experience and exposure to multiple 
conditions or clinical situations. Providers can be motivated uniquely, the incentive size 
is a single, quantitative component, while what motivates a person is based on a number 
of personal preferences and perspectives (Khullar et al., 2015). Default knowledge of 
providers relies on their individually unique education experiences; varying factors 
include the diversity in instructors to the distractions of life, individually alternating a 
subjective use of clinical processes of care lacking uniformity and universal quality of 
care (Conrad, 2015). 
The individual provider’s ethical decision-making approach links the physician’s 
residency training environment, intellectual diversity, personal motivation triggers, 
diversity in the quality of education of ranked medical schools, and personal ethics; these 
further contribute to the discrepancy in the delivery of quality care (Conrad, 2016; 
Conrad & Perry, 2009). Aligning provider performance with a sufficient financial 
incentive size will support and enhance quality of care improving the country’s health, 
health care spending, and utilization trends in the United States (Conrad, 2016).  
In this study, I highlighted the alignment of financial incentive size and provider 
decision-making behaviors in an ACO-contracted setting. ACOs have three APM options 
for organizations that choose to participate in the federal delivery program (CMS, 2017a). 
In this study, I focused on the Medicare Shared Savings Program, financial incentive size, 
and ACO performance impact of the federal delivery program. 




medical care (Gu et al., 2014). The social change implications for this research include 
potentially improving the quality of health care delivered to an estimated 57 million 
people enrolled in Medicare (Social Security Administration, 2016). Improving the 
quality of care and reducing health expenditures for Medicare recipients will ultimately 
improve their health care experience. This is accomplished by utilizing more efficient 
financial incentives and contractually implementing universal clinical quality standards 
of provider treatment behavior at the primary care level. There is a fundamental need for 
universal quality care and universal standard defaults contractually mandated to assist in 
the redevelopment of the existing health care delivery and reimbursement system 
supported by the value-based payment incentive theory (VBPIT) framework of the study. 
This model should balance the coordination of ACO structural operative change, through 
defined and legally binding expectations of universal clinical quality standards utilizing 
APMs inclusive of programs developed by CMS to potentially support application of this 
strategy into the private insurance sector, expanding federal regulation of insurance 
standards and accountability.  
In Chapter 2, I will discuss the supporting literature and background on the use of 
CMS-quality formulated programs, cost-effective measures delivering value-based 
incentives, the Medicare population, and the reformation of health care strategies to 
contain costs while improving quality and promoting healthy outcomes with meaningful 
incentive models and metrics. The purpose of this research was to determine the 
relationships that address the unreliable quality in the delivery of care within the United 




Program (MSSP) incentive size and ACO performance on acute care readmissions, 
outpatient emergency department visits, and per capita total performance year spending. 
With this study, I also intended to identify and determine the nature of the relationship 
between financial incentive size and ACO performance. Once developed, the research 
questions and hypotheses shaped the study design through the lens of the VBPIT. Using a 
cross-sectional correlational design, interactions between variables were examined 
through linear regression models. These models were used to determine whether a 
predictive relationship exists between the independent variable and dependent variables.  
Background 
The ACA of 2010 was the political window of opportunity to realign the complex 
and uncoordinated U.S. health care delivery system with one that is responsive to the 
meaningful use of financial incentives delivered through ACOs. The goal of the 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) was aggressive because the nation’s 
health delivery system transitioned from volume to value-based incentive formats (CMS, 
2015). Thus, the CMS constructed an ACO approach utilizing a reformed payment model 
that is inclusive of a financial incentive component for participating as MSSP 
organizations (CMS, 2015). In this study, I scrutinized the potential predictive 
relationship of the MSSP incentive size on acute readmissions rates and the frequency of 
emergency department (ED) visits not resulting in a hospital admission, both expensive 
services are avoidable through comprehensive and responsive preventative primary care 
at the ACO level, working collaboratively to improve the continuity of care and reduce 




The goal of CMS is to transition 90% of existing fee-for-service payment 
arrangements into value-based payments by 2018, holding health care organizations 
accountable for quality and conjoining points of care and service coordination through 
the contracted use of CMS benchmarks supporting alternative payment models (Burwell, 
2015). The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of June 2015 (MACRA) was 
a catalyst to produce greater quality and comprehensive health care and is expected to be 
a spending containment mechanism to develop smaller, more manageable populations 
(Arnold, 2016). The organizational and economic shift follows an alternative payment 
model using bundled or episode-based payments and incentives to improve the alignment 
of the structural operations within ACOs (Vogus & Singer, 2016). 
Typically, incentives have focused on influencing patient behavior to improve 
health outcomes, with a distinctive gap in the literature on the provider’s performance 
motivated by the size of the financial incentive of the MSSP (Khullar et al., 2015). 
Several gaps in the literature exist around the association between incentive size and the 
performance of an ACO. Gaps include the available literature on payment model success 
and the successful ACO operational structure sustained by incentive size. The incentive 
size of the reward influences provider behavior, while contributing to the knowledge of 
decision-making processes that yield the most improved health outcomes and related cost 
savings per member of the ACO targeted population (Kronick, Casalino, & Bindman, 
2015; Peterson et al., 2006). There is no existing literature in which a researcher or 
researchers questioned or studied the relationship between the absolute incentive sizes, 




most extant studies, researchers assessed the performance of ACOs with limited attention 
to incentive size and primarily a focus on percentages to show savings (Layton & Ryan, 
2015; McWilliams, Landon, & Chernew, 2013). 
The literature surrounding the scope of this study includes various approaches 
when delivering quality health care. Research has been sparse regarding the concept of 
cost-effective measures that produce increased quality of care by applying a value-based 
incentive strategy (Bardach et al., 2013). Researchers have concentrated on financial 
incentives that impact the quality of health care, provider behavior that contributes to the 
alignment of medical decision-making, and the incentive size that influences positive 
change. Bardach et al. (2013) also suggested that quality-formulated incentive models are 
efficient when incentives are designed to pay bonuses at the physician level. Financial 
incentives are particularly useful in research that focused on people defined as “difficult 
to treat” or those with elevated health risks due to chronic conditions, both are 
characteristics of the Medicare population (Bardach et al., 2013). Financial incentives are 
used to encourage providers to deliver comprehensive care while reinforcing healthy 
patient behavior through education and appropriate medical decision-making (Comfort, 
Shortell, Rodriguez, & Colla, 2018; Khullar, 2015; McWilliams et al., 2013). Financial 
incentives are an instrument to encourage systemic change to the nation’s health care 
delivery system by supporting changes to health policy and provider-specific 
motivational incentives attached to intrinsic and extrinsic incentive rewards (McWilliams 
et al., 2013). 




incentive payment schemes. Prior to Conrad’s (2015) development of the VBPIT, there 
lacked a theoretical or conceptual framework to guide research focused on influencing 
provider motivation and behavior, presenting as a limitation of the design (Scott, Liu, & 
Yong, 2016). Scott et al. (2016) also performed an empirical article review applying the 
APM framework in their study aimed at cost and quality of value-based purchasing in the 
health care industry with a synopsis of design features. 
McWilliams et al. (2013) found a relationship between alternative quality 
contracts and reduced spending on Medicare participants and revealed a sporadic and 
deficient consistency of quality delivered care. By rewarding participating providers 
through global payment incentives contractually designed to produce improved quality 
and reduced spending through behavioral changes leading to more efficient processes, 
provider performance is optimized by refining their clinical decision-making influenced 
by effective incentive size (McWilliams, 2013). Researchers have suggested that larger 
incentive rewards will reduce the customary fee-for-service spending and under- or 
overtreatment utilization patterns currently occurring (McWilliams, Chernew, Landon & 
Schwartz, 2015). Shortcomings in the existing fee-for-service reimbursement model are 
its misuse in the utilization of services that rewards for volume of services and cost 
containment of care (Burwell, 2015). Overuse of services results in inflated spending and 
unnecessary medical services, while underuse of services suggests and encourages 
providers to withhold care or deny a service that is needed (Epstein et al., 2014). 
Torchiana et al. (2013) showed that small incentive amounts, identified as 2% of 




Empirical findings also indicated a need to align quality metrics and incentive payment 
program models to generate valid results (Torchiana et al., 2013). Therefore, financial 
incentives may influence provider behavior but also contribute successful incentives to 
other structural characteristics of the incentive and not the size. Torchiana et al. (2013) 
evaluated the predictability of incentive size with regard to an absolute dollar amount and 
not a percentage of revenue on provider behavior in an ACO environment, analyzing 
readmission rates, ED frequency, and per capita expenditures. 
 There is a need to describe how bonus payments are processed and structured in 
provider groups in order to link health outcomes to a particular data element reported by 
ACOs (Salisbury-Afshar, 2012). Salisbury-Afshar’s (2012) findings supported alignment 
of per capita figures to meaningful incentive models and metrics effective at improving 
quality and health status of the ACO subpopulation. Salisbury-Afshar’s analysis also 
yielded insufficient statistical data that incentives produce improved quality at the 
primary care level. Of the 80 empirical studies reviewed in Scott et al. (2016) research, 
no relationship was found between financial incentive size and the percentage of positive 
health outcomes. In no other study was the dollar amounts of financial incentives 
evaluated, only percentage values have been assessed. Limited empirical studies exist on 
the examination of incentive size in a single program, and positive health outcomes 
inclusive of this research are a reduction in ED visits and acute care readmissions 
(Werner, Kolstad, Stuart, & Polsky, 2011). These reductions imply that more effective 
service and treatment utilizations at the primary care level are circumventing expenses, 




In Chapter 2, I will discuss how the linking of ACO performance and provider 
decision-making as a mechanism to improve patient health outcomes has not been 
applied to APMs for financial incentive research. There are several mainstream gaps of 
knowledge: Of the 80 empirical studies reviewed by Scott et al. (2016), incentive size 
was not associated with having a predictive relationship with quality. This finding 
supports a successfully reformed payment model or ACO operational structure with the 
use of a balanced and aligned incentive size (Khullar et al., 2015; Peterson et al., 2006; 
Werner, 2012). Balanced and aligned incentives offer an opportunity to identify a 
successful link between external incentives with the intrinsic motivation of the providers 
(Kao, 2015). The results of this study provide valuable insight into the evolution of the 
U.S. health delivery system, primarily, the potential to craft health policies supporting the 
use of contractual CMS APM programs by applying a defaulted universal quality 
standard to clinical procedures when delivering care endorsed by balanced and aligned 
financial incentives yielding enhanced quality and ACO performance. By crafting 
universally applied quality clinical standards supported by the contractual mutual interest 
of the principle agent component of the VBPIT, these measures ensure a universal 
standard of quality applied to the APMs utilizing behavioral economic defaults to 
develop regulatory standards of clinical processes of ACO-assigned recipients. This 
action will provide policy building potential to expand this contractual quality 





 The new ACA of 2010 payment reform models recognized that balanced 
motivation between intrinsic and extrinsic factors is needed to construct an efficient 
provider incentive reward model. In recent years, there has been a shift from volume to 
value-based incentives that shape provider behavior (Burwell, 2015, Khullar et al., 2015). 
Prior to the ACA, the industry rewarded providers for quantity rather than quality, 
resulting in the inconsistent delivery of comprehensive health care services and an 
increase in related health care expenses. Incentive alignment and balance are related to 
provider medical decision-making and the weak alignment between financial incentives 
and intrinsic motivation also known as incentive neutrality (Kao, 2015). To address the 
problem, the ACA developed APMs, such as ACOs. These newly drafted APMs have 
presented a moderately robust incentive size regardless of the program model, which 
ranges from 2% to a mere 3.9% motivation tool, taking the place of fee-for-services 
reimbursement methods (CMS, 2017a). The DHHS goals are to tie 90% of traditional 
Medicare fee-for-service reimbursements to quality measures using APMs by 2018, 
further supporting integration and coordination of care defined as comprehensive 
(Burwell, 2015). With proper alignment of financial incentives, a refined strategy could 
potentially improve the efficiency of health care services, contain expenditures, and 
ensure the delivery of quality care. This behavioral economic problem lies in the balance 
of motivation of the provider through extrinsic and intrinsic rewards. Financial incentives 
serve as a powerful tool for the federal government to stimulate quality medical decision-




The quality of care has grown routinely inconsistent in the delivery of comprehensive and 
coordinated care, fueled by deficiencies in uniformed provider medical decision-making. 
The U.S. health care delivery system requires a payment incentive structure that promotes 
the alignment of incentive size and ACO performance. The effectiveness of the CMS-
formulated financial incentives continues to lack analytic and quantitative assessment, 
with no evidence of the optimal incentive size or design as producing the most efficient 
quality outcomes and implementation approaches (Peterson et al., 2006; Scott et al., 
2016). Incentive size and strength is not a new concept, but its use among public health 
programs and ACOs is recent. However, little is known about its impact on the ACO’s 
quality or provider’s medical decision-making processes with regard to influence or 
noninfluence. The focus of this study was the weak alignment of financial incentives and 
provider medical decision-making behavior resulting in the ACO performance changes.   
 Berenson and Rice (2016) suggested that stronger intrinsic motivation is essential 
in policy building and recommended reconsideration of the role of the financial incentive 
in the APM used by the CMS in the ACO setting. Reformed ACO financial incentives 
have the potential to reward aligned decision-making by providers and administrators, 
offering a second option for assuming financial risk at a higher rate of return, eventually 
penalizing ACOs (Burwell, 2015). Prior research has demonstrated that applications of 
behavioral economics can increase the effects of financial incentives and enhance their 
outcomes, furthermore contributing to the balance of providers’ personal intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivators (Khullar et al., 2015; Luft, 2015).  




performance by working collaboratively within and between networked provider 
specialties, facilities, and departments, producing a consistent and seamless delivery of 
health care services (CMS, 2016; Kessler et al., 2015). The MSSP provides the ACO with 
a risk-based option between two incentive reward-penalty tracks (Kessler et al., 2015). 
The MSSP requires a minimum of 5,000 participants in a fee-for-service payment 
arrangement that follows nationally-recognized quality measures outlined by the Agency 
for Health Research and Quality (AHRQ; Fingar & Washington, 2015). The AHRQ 
focuses on the patient’s experience, care coordination and continuity, and preventative 
health care among at-risk populations (Kessler et al., 2015).  
A comparison of the quality of care with CMS-produced benchmarks per the 
contracted period, under a risk adjustment model to calculate expected expenditures per 
Medicare recipient, determines whether or not a shared savings or loss occurs (CMS, 
2015b). This risk adjustment is subject to shifting benchmarks with the use of a national 
growth rate to account for various health resource usage and linked expenditures per the 
recipient annually (CMS, 2015b). Each track provides an opportunity for the ACO to 
earn financial incentive rewards by placing risk and accountability on the ACO 
participating in either track with the appropriate balance of risk (CMS, 2105). Should the 
ACO quality standards meet the benchmarks, CMS will apply a sharing rate based on 
ACO performance per track model (CMS, 2015).  
The prediction and potential impact of the MSSP are designed to encourage 
motivationally-aligned provider decision-making with balanced financial incentives, 




comprehensive care simultaneously (DeCamp et al., 2014; Salisbury-Afshar, 2012). A 
balanced reward system utilizes two dimensions of processes in management to craft a 
technical and a sociocultural balance (Werner, 2012). The supporting knowledge gap 
surrounds the ability of the incentive component of the reformed payment models to 
produce a strong organizational structure and incentive-balance. There is limited existing 
literature concerning whether a sufficient incentive size value would improve health care 
quality in an ACO setting. Currently, no peer-reviewed studies suggest a link between 
CMS-defined benchmarks and health outcomes and indicators of provider behavioral 
influences that impact ACO performance and quality (Salisbury-Afshar, 2012). The CMS 
benchmarks are the quality indicators deemed important in the review of quality of care, 
helping to universally measure delivered services and comprehensive care (CMS, 2017b; 
Salisbury-Afshar, 2012); these are the same measures of quality used in the CMS 
database applied to the research questions and statistical analysis in this study. There 
remains a gap in literature concerning the relationships between MSSP incentive size and 
ACO performance as they relate to health care resource spending and utilization of the 
participating member. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this cross-sectional study was to examine the predictive 
relationships between the MSSP incentive size and ACO performance on acute care 
readmissions, outpatient emergency room visits, and per capita total performance year 
spending. The results of this research could potentially identify essential mechanisms and 




of the financial incentive size (see DeCamp et al., 2013).  
Research Questions & Hypotheses 
The main objective of this research was to determine whether the reformed 
alternative payment-incentive model of the ACA is effective and robust enough to 
influence ACO performance and provider treatment behaviors within ACOs contractually 
participating in the MSSP. I developed the following research questions and hypotheses 
to guide this study: 
Research Question 1: How does the MSSP value-based incentive size relate to the 
ACOs’ performance on acute care readmission rates?  
H01:  There is no statistical relationship between the incentive size of the 
MSSP and acute care readmission rates in an ACO setting. 
H11:  There is a statistical relationship between the incentive size of the 
MSSP and acute care readmission rates in an ACO setting. 
Research Question 2: How does the MSSP value-based incentive size relate to the 
ACOs’ performance on the frequency of ED visits that do not result in a hospital 
admission? 
H02:  There is no statistical relationship between the incentive size of the 
MSSP and ED visits in an ACO setting. 
H12: There is a statistical relationship between the incentive size of the 
MSSP and ED visits in an ACO setting. 
Research Question 3: What is the association between the MSSP value-based 





H03: There is no statistical relationship between the incentive size of the 
MSSP and per capita expenditures in an ACO setting. 
H13:  There is a statistical relationship between the incentive size of the 
MSSP and per capita expenditures in an ACO setting. 
I extracted secondary data online from the CMS from a publicly-accessible file 
containing ACO quality performance metrics inclusively documented on the archival 
database (see Frankfort-Nachmias, Nachmias & DeWaard, 2015). All hypothesized 
variables were represented in this single database. The ability to use ratio scaling 
contributes to the quantification of the theory and study outcomes (Frankfort-Nachmias et 
al., 2015). 
Theoretical Framework 
Theory of Value-Based Payment Incentives 
The guiding framework that I used to assess the potential relationship between 
incentive size and ACO performance measures was the VBPIT, which merges concepts 
of behavioral economics and the principal-agent theories (see Conrad, 2015). Williams, 
Costa, Odunlami, and Mohammad (2008) drew attention to the need for a “…systematic 
evaluation of social and economic policies that might have health consequences” (p. 11). 
The VBPIT is used to identify motivationally-balanced incentives to improve care by 
applying a robust incentive value and contractually structured internal process to enhance 
the patient experience when there is the need to develop realistic quality benchmarks to 




with the identification of incentive size value impact, the knowledge of how motivators 
influence behavior can be used to assist in customizing successful ACO processes. 
The inconsistency of internal operations and structured processes of an ACO 
affects the provider’s performance and quality of care received by MSSP beneficiaries. 
The VBPIT merges components of both the principal-agent and behavioral economic 
theories by strategically monitoring reward and penalty systems; the systems meant to 
align health service continuity, optimize care delivery, and induce motivationally-
balanced provider medical decision-making as a cost savings measure (Conrad, 2015). 
The principal-agent theoretical component of the VBPIT introduces a controlled 
contractual arrangement between the principal (i.e., the individual receiving care) and the 
agent (i.e., the MSSP- contracted ACO), thereby delineating the logical alignment of 
shared interests (Conrad, 2015). According to the conceptual framework of the VBPIT, 
factors driving incentive strength include direct incentive effects on outcomes and 
behavior, cost coverage of operations, prospective and fixed incentive structure, and size 
of payment with duration and stability in the payment arrangement (Conrad, 2015). 
The VBPIT applied to this study because the ACO MSSP uses a contractual 
agreement that ensures an economic relationship between the patient, or consumer of 
services, and the ACO providers. Theoretically, the financial incentive payment strategy 
supports the common interest shared by the principal and the agent (Conrad, 2015). In 
this study, I questioned the allure of the incentive size in a coordinated and 
comprehensive health delivery setting, coupled with the need to challenge control costs, a 




the need for cost reduction in the delivery of services and places accountability and risk 
on the ACO and the providers involved in the coordination of care. The theory 
conceptually implies that value-based reimbursement structures, with properly-motivated 
providers, will deliver improved quality of care that will maximize both provider/ACO 
net income and health benefits for beneficiaries through competitive incentives, 
subsequently encouraging an industry shift from volume to the value of care (Conrad, 
2015). 
Behavioral Economics 
Providers present a behavioral challenge because their motivators lie in a diverse 
range of intrinsic and extrinsic factors. Behavioral economics applied to contractually 
arranged incentives can theoretically enhance the effects of financial incentives, 
promoting an improved medical decision-making process through behavior expectations 
of the providers or agents (Conrad, 2015, Khullar et. al, 2015). The theory of behavioral 
economics suggests that encouraging incentives have characteristics of the behavior of 
the incentive (Conrad, 20115).  These features include the timing of the incentive 
distribution; the frequency of payment; and the size of the stimulus or its delivery, if such 
delivery is more efficient when there are several smaller payments compared to a single 
annual bonus (Khullar et. al, 2015). Berenson and Rice (2015) suggested that behavioral 
economics argues that a financial incentive, regardless of size, has the potential to 
compromise the provider's intrinsic motivation. Researchers have strived for incentive 




with those professional values and ethics held by the ACO provider and administration 
(Roland & Dudley, 2015). 
Nature of the Study 
In this research, I used a quantitative, cross-sectional, correlational design. I 
examined the relationships between incentive size and ACO performance on readmission 
frequency, ED visits, and per capita spending. The cross-sectional design allowed for the 
testing of whether incentive size is related to organizational performance for a large 
sample of ACOs participating in the MSSP. The goal of this study was to determine 
whether a predictive link exists between these validated metrics and the extent of the 
strength or weakness and the correlated positive or negative direction. 
In this study, I used secondary data generated by the CMS. CMS collects 
performance data from all participating ACOs in the MSSP. These data are publicly 
accessible via their website via a public use file (PUF). The Accountable Care 
Organization PUF is updated annually, with full data for 2015 currently available (CMS, 
2015a). 
The focused variables in this study included the MSSP’s incentive size (i.e., the 
predictor variable) of bonuses intended to influence and motivate health care providers 
and administration working in an ACO team-based setting. The dependent variables were 
the ACO performance variables: MSSP hospital readmission rates, outpatient ED visits, 
and per person expenditures of the Medicare ACO population. The variables examined in 
this study are included in the CMS MSSP ACO PUF. This 2015 database collects 




determine whether goals and quality measures meet the defined benchmarks. These CMS 
developed and defined benchmarks include a 33-point quality scale encompassing four 
quality specific domains focused on the patient and/or caregiver experience and 
coordinated continuity of care as per patient safety and at risk populations (CMS, 2015). 
Each area plays a role in the adapted ACO collaborative approach in the delivery of 
universal quality care.  
I used a linear regression model design to analyze the associations between the 
independent and dependent variables when using group outcomes for comparison of 
incentive size studied (see Field, 2013). This design type acts in three ways: control, 
elaboration, and prediction (Frankfort et al., 2015). Linear regression measures the 
predictor values or the influence of the independent variables on the outcome variables, 
thus quantifying the findings (Field, 2013). Field (2013) referred to the use of a straight 
line to define the slope of the line (i.e., gradient) and the location that the line crosses the 
vertical axis (i.e., intercept point) on the graph generating the regression coefficient. I 
used the regression model to test the relationships between incentive size and ACO 
performance variables while controlling for organizational characteristics such as the 
number of participating hospitals; the number of beneficiaries age 85 and older; ACO 
size; the number of males; and the number of beneficiaries identified as disabled, 
including the percent of African American and Hispanic Medicare participants at the 
ACO-level. 
Definitions 




health services that utilize groups of providers, coordinating and cooperating with 
multiple departments and specialties to improve the current level of quality delivered care 
for Medicare beneficiaries (CMS, 2017).  
Acute care readmissions: A recently-discharged patient who returns to the 
hospital within a defined timeframe as a result of the same acute health episode 
(Webster’s Dictionary, n.d.).  
Alternative payment models (APMs): A payment reform model that integrates 
quality and total cost of care into financial incentive structure (CMS, 2016).  
Financial incentive: A monetary bonus/reward or penalty that can encourage 
individual provider or team behaviors (CMS, 2016). 
Incentive alignment: A balance of incentive structure, incentive size, and in the 
identification of meaningful use metrics of quality when identifying success and 
motivating and encouraging provider treatment behavior. 
Incentive size: The value of the extrinsic reward that reinforces provider behavior 
and performance (Conrad, 2015). 
Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP): The federal program facilitating 
comprehensive and coordinated care to improve the quality of care for the Medicare 
population by using reformed payment models and structure of care by providing a 
shared savings option of reward when health status improves and expenditure growth is 
reduced or controlled (CMS, 2017).  
Outpatient emergency department (ED) visits: An ED visit resulting in no hospital 




Pay for performance: The value-based payment model utilizing financial 
incentives in attaining specific performance measures (Lee et al., 2013). 
Per capita health care spending: The per person health related expenses (CMS, 
2015).  
Total performance year spending: All health care related expenditures associated 
per person for a single year (CMS, 2015). 
Value-based care: A single, bundled payment for health services per episode 
supported by quality improvement and cost savings (Lee et al., 2013; Scott et al., 2016). 
Volume-based care: The traditional fee for service reimbursement for providers 
meeting volume specific goals (Burwell, 2015). 
Assumptions 
I held four assumptions in the study: (a) CMS’s use of meaningful measures are in 
alignment with the production of quality in ACOs, (b) extrinsic rewards will modify 
provider behavior in medical decision-making, (c) ACOs are run operationally different, 
and (d) the process of improved quality is ongoing. I made these assumptions because 
each ACO operates differently in structure, and there are implications of weakness when 
analyzing statistical data and in determining performance quality. Controlling for 
variations in infrastructure, operational structure, and internal processes are challenging, 
but these factors were managed in the study with control variables to capture outliers (see 
Kronick et al., 2015). The control variables in this study included the African American 
and Hispanic races given their health disparities based on socio-economic variables, ACO 




readmission patterns may alter based on the ACOs unique goals, and those aged 85 years 
or older because their health conditions are likely to be chronic and more complex 
meaning more expensive. These selected covariates had the potential to skew the 
statistics due to their extraneous nature. For these controlled confounding variables, 
resource usage is high; furthermore, expenditures are higher for those where health 
attention was delayed or the chronically ill and for those that are 85 years or older, 
resources are more frequently used, such as ED and hospital services, adding to the 
extreme health related costs that essentially skew the average usage and expenses of the 
Medicare recipients. These variables may inadvertently alter performance and are 
uncontrollable by the physician, regardless of motivation or medical decision-making. 
 Some ACO contracts pair with a hospital and others do not (CMS, 2017a; CMS, 
2017b). A contractual relationship potentially influences the data, therefore, I included 
hospital participation as a variable to be controlled for. These control variables present as 
outliers and remain a threat to internal validity similar to regression artifacts (Shadish, 
Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Assuming that the operational structure of the ACO and the 
incentive design process of improvement are ongoing, I had to assume the inevitability of 
quality evolution through sound payment structures and in the coordination of services 
that optimize patient health and the related costs of care (see Conrad, 2015). Conrad’s 
(2015) synthesis of literature on the VBPIT supported the assumption that the greater the 
incentive, the higher the ACO performance. However, the study presented obstacles in 




incentive alignment between provider behavior or medical decision-making and the 
patient’s health value. 
Limitations 
The limitations of this study included the threat to internal validity of the research, 
the internal structure of the incentive, assignment of beneficiaries per ACO, and lack of 
uniformity of procedures and services in delivering care. In establishing internal validity 
of the research design, I identified the independent variable (i.e., incentive size) as a 
predictor for the changes in the dependent variables (i.e., acute readmissions, per capita 
spending, and ED visits). Validity in the selection of beneficiaries was in question. 
Socioeconomic factors play a role in expected health outcomes due to disparities in the 
access to care for specific racial groups (CMS, 2016). Since the assignment of 
beneficiaries to ACOs is uncontrolled, there is no accounting for patient health disparities 
among socioeconomic differences. Selection bias surfaced as a threat to internal validity 
in the assignment of Medicare beneficiaries (see Creswell, 2009). The assignment of 
beneficiaries is not based on condition or health status but rather criteria includes age 
requirements, participation in Medicare, a qualifying provider visit (ACO related or not) 
within the last 12 months, proximity, and geographic location (CMS, 2017). Many health 
outcomes are predetermined by the quality and access to health care of the patient from 
childhood to retirement age, and these differences in health status are known as health 
disparities, impacting the health status of a variety of beneficiaries. The success of an 
ACO’s performance is partly based on patient outcomes, so I controlled for two racial 




selection bias, I included all participating ACOs. 
Operational processes define an ACOs’ structure and managerial strategy to care. 
Weak or undefined operational methods are expected to have an indirect influence on the 
effect of the financial incentive size on performance measures within an ACO delivery 
setting. This diversity in organization infrastructure and processes of care are autonomous 
and lack uniformity among health care environments (Kronick et al., 2015). In the ACO 
environment, there are contractual applications to operations and processes of care which 
can also be used to ensure consistency in quality of care for this population. By 
contractually applying these parameters, there can be more control over spending and 
higher assurance that each patient is provided universal quality by following a standard of 
processes in delivering care (Kronick et al., 2015). 
Scope and Delimitations 
The scope of this research was limited to ACOs contracted to provide services 
and care to the Medicare population through the CMS MSSP. In the analysis conducted, I 
followed the 2015 structure of the MSSP and the collection of CMS archival data. The 
raw data collected are generated by individual ACOs. Each ACO provides a unique 
perspective because each ACO is operationally structured and managed differently with 
regulations surrounding incentive payment calculations but without universal standard 
operational processes with stipulations enforced by the CMS. There is questionable bias 
in the selection of quality metrics that signify the quality, and there are concerns of 
indirectly linked metrics that would indicate the incentive size. The diversity of the 




used archival data from 2015, before additional alterations of the incentive track and 
evolving quality measures that link provider treatment and decision-making as a source 
of improvement were used (see Holland & Knight, LLP, 2015).  
In this quantitative study, I focused on the Medicare population, and findings 
were generalizable to this sample. The Medicare subpopulation was the generalizable 
boundary in the analysis. The ACO is a modified strategy delivering health 
services/treatment without access impeding quality of care or cost containment 
approaches applied (CMS, 2017a). The determination of a properly balanced incentive 
model could optimize the quality of care, further promoting comprehensive and 
coordinated care. 
Significance 
The findings of this study contribute to social change by informing the country’s 
internal restructuring efforts of an ineffective and fragmented health care system with 
goals to strengthen the economy. Incentive-balanced alignments could add to the success 
of the ACO’s organizational structure by identifying variables that represent outcomes 
linked to the incentive-formulated reward system. Providers perceive the value of care 
differently based on individual ethics and morals (Roland & Dudley, 2015). A 
motivationally-equivalent incentive size produces ethically-driven administrative 
decisions and provider treatment options that may be quantifiable, such as in a reduction 
in readmission, outpatient ED visit frequency of ACO beneficiaries, or resource usage 
affecting per capita expenses. At times, medical decisions are made in the best interest of 




necessary services. Ethically-driven decisions are reinforced by autonomy, beneficence, 
and justice (Williams & Torrens, 2008). Medical and administrative decisions should not 
induce harm onto others but promote patient welfare with equal access to services in an 
environment where physicians have the freedom to treat patients without limitations or 
restrictions (Williams & Torrens, 2008). Incentive neutrality may hypothetically lead to 
improved health outcomes in ACOs (Kao, 2015; Kronick et al., 2015).  
ACO structural efficiency can be enhanced when incentive size is large enough to 
stimulate the targeted provider decision-making behavior (James, 2012; Kao, 2015; Nix, 
2013; Torchiana et al., 2013). Financial incentive models continue to struggle with the 
organizational balance of internal managerial or operational features that can forecast 
ACO success. ACOs assume the risk for their subpopulations’ health outcomes via 
continuity and comprehensive delivery of care, while reducing resource usage within the 
ACO, using mindful organizing in operational processes and procedures (Abduljawad & 
Al-Assaf, 2011; Vogus & Singer, 2016). 
The implications for positive social change align with a value-based, reformed 
payment incentive model. The development of an efficient operational process of ACO 
success and the identification of ACO characteristics of an effective financial incentive 
size may balance provider motivation and maximize the ACO subpopulations’ health 
outcomes while controlling expenditures.  The results of this study may assist in 
identifying characteristics of an efficient financial incentive model that could potentially 
reduce spending and improve health outcomes, providing a framework for successful 




could help to determine the suitable components directly contributing to successful ACO 
performance. 
Summary 
 In hopes of attaining universal health care quality in the United States, the most 
recent strategic approach to enhance the quality of care is the use of emerging APMs. The 
use of financial incentives has been a feature of these APMs to improve health quality 
with the efficient use of health care resources, contributing to stability in the delivery of 
care. In this chapter, I highlighted the study design and the statistical, theoretical, and 
methodological approaches used. This chapter also included the empirical and 
methodological literature support of researchers who examined financial incentives and 
the defined benchmarks measuring quality features developed by the CMS that yield 
rewards to either the provider or the ACO. A more stimulating and balanced incentive 
will provide the best opportunity for ACOs to be accountable for their provider’s altered 
medical decision-making, leading to improved health outcomes that indicate an 
operationally successful APM (Conrad, 2015, Kao, 2015). Improved alignment of 
external incentives with intrinsic provider motivation offers the greatest chance to alter 
provider decision-making behavior through a collaborative effort to deliver 
comprehensive and coordinated services (Kao, 2015). 
 The purpose of this quantitative research was the correlation of probable variable 
relationships applied through a cross-sectional design guiding the research questions 
tested through linear regression. I used secondary data in this study. The study was 




universal quality health care that aligns stakeholders with shared interests in the outcomes 
as a result of the financial incentive designs of the CMS programs (see Conrad, 2015). 
The theory further indicates the need to develop a motivationally-balanced reward 
mechanism (i.e., financial incentive) that produces ethically-influenced provider 
decision-making (Conrad, 2015). The significance and positive social change 
implications of this can be applied nationally with the potential to impact the operational 
restructuring of the health care delivery framework in the health care industry. 
In Chapter 2, I will provide an analytically comprehensive perspective of related 
literature and empirical studies linked to a robust application of financially-influencing 
incentive size.  Incentive size aimed at behavioral changes concerning the decision-
making processes of providers and motivated coordination of services.  The literature 
presented will provided validity and support in the research proposed and performed in 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
Financial incentives and provider decision-making are often misaligned, which 
can contribute to the unreliable quality of health care and poor continuity of delivered 
health services (Conrad, 2015). Empirical studies have found that financial incentives can 
affect the health outcomes, spending trends, and resource usage of a defined population 
(McWilliams et al., 2015; Nyweide et al., 2015; O’Donnell, Anand, Ganser, & Wexler, 
2015). Financial incentives are also used to motivate provider behavior; they improve 
health outcomes and reduce spending through defined and specific benchmarks with the 
ultimate goal to deliver improved comprehensive treatment behaviors and the potential to 
influence the physician’s medical decision-making (Abduljawad & Al-Assaf, 2011). 
In an effort to improve quality and efficiency, APMs, such as those set by the 
CMS (2015b), provide a reward, in this case an incentive.  Rewards are meant to 
influence physician behavior in medical decision-making and treatment selection. ACOs 
offer incentives to engage providers to participate in a team approach to coordinate care 
and enhance medical decision-making with improved quality outcomes in mind (CMS, 
2015b).  
CMS is working on linking Medicare payments to quality performance measures 
featuring APM goals.  CMS intends to link 30% of the Medicare payments and 85% 
Medicare fee-for-service payments to quality expectations by the close of 2016 (Burwell, 




conceptual models of community-devised ACOs meeting the surge in value-based care 
(Burwell, 2015). 
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationships between incentive size 
and ACO performance measured by using rates of acute care readmissions, outpatient ED 
visits, and annual per capita spending. The Medicare beneficiaries served by ACOs 
participating in the MSSP are identified as the most at-risk population to receive 
“inferior” health care to privately-insured consumers (Spencer, Gaskin, & Roberts, 2013, 
p. 1731). A theoretically-supported incentive structure in an ACO setting allows for the 
clinical integration of services to provide complete and coordinated alignment of care 
with the strongest potential to achieve higher quality of care at lower cost (Conrad, 2015; 
Conrad & Perry, 2009). 
In this chapter, I will cover the literature search strategy and literature synopsis of 
the data collection. My findings in this review contribute to the expansion of knowledge 
on the VBPIT. This chapter will also include an extensive review of the relationship 
between the incentive size of the MSSP and acute care readmission rates, ED visits, and 
per capita spending of beneficiaries in an ACO delivery setting. 
Literature Search Strategy 
The databases that I used in the literature search included ProQuest, Google 
Scholar, and the Education Resources Information Center online digital library. Studies 
were narrowed by publication year to include focused, timeframe-based literature on the 
ACA of 2010, so I could identify specific programs after the implementation of new 




payment (i.e., capitation), shared savings, and Pioneer ACO models. Pioneer ACO 
models are designed for health care organizations that already provide coordinated 
patient care and allow provider groups to rapidly move from a shared savings payment 
model to a population-based payment model separate from MSSP (CMS, 2017b). I used 
each keyword search term interchangeably among the listed databases. Keyword search 
terms included combinations of the following: incentive size, behavioral economics, 
value-based payment incentive theory, Pioneer ACO, MSSP, and alternative payment 
reform. 
 The dependent variables in this study were acute care readmissions, emergency 
department (ED) visits, and per capita spending. I searched for these dependent variables 
in combination with the terms accountable care organizations (ACO) and quality of care. 
The literature search was also expanded to include variations of these key terms, adding a 
combination of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation to influence provider behavior, with the 
goal of capturing the economic effects of a behavioral perspective of aligned incentive 
size. 
Motivation of Change in Provider Behavior 
Care and treatment decisions by physicians are encouraged and influenced 
through financial incentives with the intent to improve performance that results in 
improved health outcomes and meaningful use of quality indicators (Abduljawad & Al-
Assaf, 2011). Intrinsic motivation can be associated with any health professional with the 
power to influence clinical decisions. A review of studies linked to quality financial 




but positive effects were seen in the same group if incentive bonuses occur at the 
provider level (Peterson et al., 2006). Based on a review from Peterson et al. (2006), there 
is support of a principal-agent relationship with the use of incentive-structured ACO 
contracts. This relationship demonstrates how applying behavioral economics to adjust 
and align incentive size with ACO performance can expand the knowledge surrounding 
the value-based incentive payment theory (Conrad, 2015; Conrad & Perry, 2009; 
Peterson et al., 2006). 
This research is one of the first to apply the VBPIT. The theory application is not 
linked to a specific setting or group (e.g., an ACO). This is an aspect that actually adds to 
the expansion and strength of the theory (Conrad, 2015). Individually distributed 
incentive bonuses, as opposed to a group-based payment, promote a stronger influence of 
change provider behavior, further enhancing and aligning performance (Conrad, 2015). A 
universal standard of quality metric or preset benchmark applied in the allocation and in 
the calculation of incentive rewards does not exist; it is critical in identifying valid and 
reliable measures of quality performance to base incentives (Fisher et al., 2012). 
The U.S. federal government aims to provide a monitored health care delivery 
environment, paired with a supportive payment system, such as financial incentives. This 
is a move that calls for the development of organizations that approach health care as a 
patient-centered team; with the goal to support high-performance levels based on value-
based payment incentives reinforced by universal processes (IOM, 2001). Core patient 
needs in health care include care that is safe, effective, patient-centered, timely and 




Singer, 2016). Provider behavior is central in continued improvements directly correlated 
with quality of care and improved health outcomes (Abduljawad & Al-Assaf, 2011).  
Our nation’s quality improvement strategy is designed to motivate health care 
provider behavior. Financial incentives are a fiscal tool in the country’s strategy to 
improve quality by aligning incentive size with defined contractually standard clinical 
processes (Siddiqui & Berkowitz, 2013). By defining and defaulting standard treatment 
and related clinical processes through federally regulated programs, such as MSSP or the 
Pioneer APMs, contractual expectations can be assigned and assessed to deliver universal 
quality of care among all health care consumers specifically those that are privately 
insured, and not just for those participating in federal health programs. Motivated 
provider decision-making guided by incentive strength will empower providers to take 
accountability for their delivery efforts in a health care system without a contractually 
defined method of reimbursement distribution universally used to affect cultural 
diversities and improve health outcomes at the ACO/provider level (Siddiqui & 
Berkowitz, 2013). Contractual arrangements provide a medium for implementing and 
assigning standardized clinical processes linked to benchmarks while ensuring quality 
expectations are achieved. 
In its current model, higher baseline spending suggests a larger initial savings for 
the ACO, however as benchmarks align with the previous performance year, ACOs will 
struggle to continue the current rate of savings. Research suggests that greater financial 
incentive and modified benchmarks will lead to larger savings (Colla & Fisher, 2017; 




benchmark approach to a more effective method of measure, by applying a CMS 
predefined benchmark hence applying a level of risk to what is now defined as a bonus 
only program through regulatory revisions (Joynt Maddox et al., 2017). Through the use 
of benchmarks, universal quality can begin to form provider behavior that yields cost 
effective concentric care and quality enhanced outcomes reinforced through a strategic 
method of balanced rewards and penalized risks. Using existing data to develop refined 
measures and adjust benchmarks that are provider-influenced and team concentric in 
nature, produces a controllable measure of quality by these stakeholders. 
Currently, there is a need to design an efficient and responsive quality-based 
value incentive program suggested by policy changes or contractual arrangements with 
quality as a dependent variable in ACO operational success as it relates to spending and 
resource usage, leads to improved health outcomes, and streamlines coordinated care.  In 
most of the reviewed literature or pilot program demonstration studies working 
collaboratively with the government and private, commercial insurance on strategies 
attaching quality-based performance to rewards. Significant data identified and relevant 
material surfaces when correlating the research variables and ACOs.  
Theoretical Foundation 
Value-Based Payment Incentive Theory (VBPIT) 
The theory applied in this study is the VBPIT.  This theory is a recently 
established microeconomic conceptual framework (Conrad, 2015). To date the VBPIT 
has not been applied to the ACO setting with value-based alternative payment models 




Based on the concept of loss aversion, the direct incentive will elicit a stronger 
response to behaviors or outcomes that are more rewarded or penalized through 
weakened marginal value of net income (Conrad, 2015). It is suggested that, through 
behavioral economics, a default can be utilized in delivering services or treatments, an 
action which can support the most cost-conscious decision. The size of an incentive is 
expected to absorb the operational costs of the organization. A fixed payment is 
conceptually expected to produce a stronger behavioral response from the provider and 
organization delivering the care, perceived through the provider’s assumption of the 
actuarial risk (Conrad, 2015). The financial incentive and the attached quality measure 
create a level of provider accountable in their medical decision-making, provided the 
value of the incentive successfully induces provider participate in a contractual 
arrangement, such as the MSSP. Providers are influenced by consistent and stable 
payments over a set period of time; these motivators can be defined through contractual 
payments (Conrad, 2015). Conrad (2015) warned about the consequences of ACO 
payment arrangements in its existing form of incentive, a form in which rewards are 
based on improvements, and not the level or quality of performance. 
Origins of the VBPIT stem from a blend of the principal-agent theory and 
behavioral economics, a blend which can be applied to the internal structure of the 
incentive design and the optimal incentive size correlated to the value of care (Conrad, 
2015). The VBPIT explains the relationship between financial incentives and behavioral 
components that influence behavioral changes in delivering value and quality. The focus 




behavior at risk of crowding-out intrinsic motivation related to medical decision-making 
and the operationally restructured internal processes based on sufficient incentive size 
value.  
Conrad’s (2015) findings of the VBPIT suggest that robust incentive size 
payments be defined through contractual agreements, such as the MSSP. The MSSP 
outlines the specified goal to reduce health spending for the Medicare patient 
subpopulation with the use of a shared savings technique through incentives; these 
incentives are defined as a percentage of the ACOs net savings as a result of the 
provider's team approach to effectively coordinate health services. The incentive size or 
value should be large enough to encourage provider participation by offering a reward for 
quality, intending to improve provider/ACO performance and medical decision-making 
(Conrad, 2015). 
A relationship must exist between the provider, facility, and the insurance 
organization in order for all involved parties, stakeholders, to be successful at cost-
effective care (Larson et al., 2012). There is a lack of regulatory contractual requirements 
between payers and providers. This requires operational restructuring of the traditional 
payment strategies with the inclusion of regulatory contracts ensuring the delivery of 
universal quality to consumers when participating in federal, and eventually private 
insurance organizations. Standardized or universal clinical processes allow all 
stakeholders to absorb the risk. Absorbing the risk means that both the payer and provider 




reflective of resource usage, and more cost-effective medical decision-making of 
provider behavior (Larson et al., 2012; Torchiana et al., 2013). 
The traditional fee-for-service reimbursement methodology alters the provider 
performance, incentivizing overuse of health resources, and leading to misuse and waste 
in the allocation of services (Menon & Kumar, 2014). Overutilization leads to increased 
expenses, poor provider decision making, and misuse of health resources (such as the 
emergency department), all of which impact the level of care quality and the consumer's 
perception of that quality. The MSSP suggests a recalibrated repayment methodology 
with a stringent use of financial incentives to improve the quality of care by providing 
accountability in performance. Customary fee-for-service payments revolved around the 
volume of services, rewarding health outcomes that are indirectly uncontrollable by the 
providers and lacking in accountability in delivering quality care (Menon & Kumar, 
2014). Value-based care utilizes an efficiency approach to care, through continuity of 
services leading to cost reduction and improved quality of care. Both value and volume 
of care are rewarded through financial incentives; but apply behavioral economics 
differently. Different behaviors are encouraged in both strategies; quality plays a role in 
the value-based rewards, where volume-based incentives fail to address quality in the 
delivery of care. Actuarial risk surfaces in the incentive design as health outcomes may 
be beyond the provider’s control, particularly in small autonomous medical practices 
(Conrad, 2015). Organizational structure also impacts the financial incentive design 




In this research, the VBPIT is applied to ACOs contracted to participate in the 
MSSP. The theory embraces diverging concepts of the principal-agent and behavioral 
economic theories. These are autonomous strategies actively utilized in delivering value-
based care controlled by an incentive-formulated reward system meant to align quality-
delivered care with provider treatment behavior and medical decision-making inducing 
comprehensive care (Conrad, 2015). 
Principal-agent theory. The principal-agent theory informs my study and the 
VBPIT through the use of contractual arrangements in the participation of the MSSP. The 
principal-agent theory assists in policy building and the identification of characteristics 
that support successful incentives by investigating size, incentive formats, and structures 
to initiate robust and competitive incentives. Eliciting provider participation, the balance 
between the right-sized incentive, and ethically-aligned physician actions can be 
constructed (Kronick et al., 2015). The study design engages the MSSP which 
participates in contractual arrangements with CMS to provide care in an ACO setting 
with strategically designed quality measures. Care is delivered in the best interest of the 
stakeholder it impacts; this portion of the VBPIT engages in the study design through the 
use of a contract and aligned interests. The principal-agent theory also frames a 
contractual arrangement between the principal and the agent, aligning shared interest of 
the two parties involved (Conrad, 2015). Through the CMS the MSSP provides a 
contractual agreement that sets standards of quality to improve the value of care by 
placing parameters of rewards and penalties dependent on quality-defined benchmarks.  




aimed at tasks that are predetermined as innate intrinsic behavior, but rather at the 
implementation of quality-specific benchmarks directly linked to rewards allocated at the 
provider level. These benchmarks provide expectations for quality of care and elevated 
levels of comprehensive care, theoretically achieving improved value of care with federal 
focus on clinical quality, improved health outcomes, and reduced expenses associated 
with the use of effective incentive strategies (Conrad, 2015; Shortell, 2016). Contract 
characteristics contribute to the success of an ACO and influence organizational structure 
by aligning services with continuity of care factors attributed to ACO implementation, 
formation, and performance expectations (Fisher et al., 2012). Continuity of care is 
central to creating realistic benchmarks to reach optional efficiency and standardized 
clinical support with evidence-based support linking health outcomes (Fisher et al., 
2012). The structure, capabilities, and activities of an ACO need clearly defined goals, 
sharp structure, engagement strategies to improve provider decisions, continuity of care, 
and quality-enhanced improvement methods (Fisher et al., 2012).  
Congruence of formation and operations includes the local market competition, 
multiple stakeholders, state political environments, per capita spending and resource 
utilization (Fisher et al., 2012). Vital processes are needed in contracts to establish 
defined quality and cost targets in shared saving disbursements and risk adjustment. 
These processes provide a mechanism to apply the reward or penalty for linked quality 
measures to shared savings, resources used, total care of cost defined, and contractual 
allowances for modifications as needed based on how quality is measured and what is 




The principal-agent theory also implies that contractual payment arrangements 
need to be structured and defined with strong incentives geared toward value of care with 
implications to policy-building. Additionally, it suggests that more robust incentives need 
to be paired with quality measures, aimed at size and form of incentives. The intent of the 
principal-agent theory is to engage the health care provider in performance-based actions 
aimed at improved health outcomes for the ACO subpopulation of the study; therefore, a 
need exists to incorporate behavioral economics to the provider’s treatment patterns, in 
order to produce the highest level of quality and value. 
Behavioral economics. Applications of behavioral economics exist in the ACO 
setting of care. Behavioral economics offers the potential to proliferate the effects of the 
“shared savings” incentives with enhanced health outcomes through balanced 
motivations for ACO providers and administration (Luft, 2015, p. 2195). Such 
connections add to the knowledge of which features will encourage an alignment of 
incentive size and ACO performance (Khullar et al., 2015; Luft, 2015).  
Kao (2015) suggested that the components of behavioral economic theory affect 
the allure of incentives to providers; resulting in an uneven distribution of attention in 
situations where “sicker” patients receive more attention. Additionally, if incentives are 
too strong or large, they can also impact the provider’s sense of autonomy and conflict 
with complex decision-making common in the subpopulation of chronically ill health 
care recipients defined in the research as the ACO (Kao, 2015). Tying this to the 
behavioral economic perspective through the contract, the tool used in the principal-agent 




provider ethics and moral influences surround the use of financial incentives in health 
care payment models, contributing to the risk of unintended consequences. Conrad 
(2015) suggested that providers take a role in the incentive design and monitoring of 
incentives. A competitively aligned incentive value with a motivating incentive size 
increases the continuity of provider-involvement and adhering to monitored clinical tasks 
in the ACO setting. These balanced incentives assist in the development of a successful 
payment design with shared risk and savings, thus aligning ACO stakeholders shared 
goals and clarity in individual influences of interest.  
With equal contribution to the VBPIT, behavioral economics and the principal-
agent theory each play a role in support of a defined use of incentive structure responsible 
for promoting greater clinical quality. Some components that contribute to this level of 
quality include the use of both individual and group-based incentive rewards, a balance of 
gain and loss in incentive risk and reward, balance incentive value, use of standard 
performance metrics, timely payments, and sustainable programs (Conrad & Perry, 
2009). Each quality component listed uniquely has the potential to inform and support the 
restructuring of the nation’s health care delivery and payment system, through a 
contractual regulatory assurance through participation in federal programs. 
Loss aversion. The fear of loss is three times stronger than monetary gain, a 
phenomenon known as loss aversion (Khullar et al., 2015). Behavioral economics 
provide validation that individual providers vary in their response to incentives. 
However, provider response can be controlled with proper alignment of structural and 




maximize benefits, and lessen unintended consequences (Kao, 2015; Roland & Dudley, 
2015). Literature pertaining to economics proposes that providers are more sensitive to 
penalties or losses than of rewards and bonuses (Roland & Dudley, 2015). The loss 
aversion concept is applied to behavioral change strategies. To effectively motivate 
contractual compliance the fear of loss is a stronger influence of behavior change than the 
actual loss or penalty (Gächter, Orzen, Renner, & Starmer, 2009).  
Default options. A derived concept from behavioral economics is defaults. 
Defaults create an unrestricted environment that secures autonomous options by placing 
defaults as the status quo or standard embedded in contractual standardization of 
processes. Applying defaults will capture lower expenditures and usage supported by the 
VBPIT. Defaults can guide decision-making treatment choices on costly service options 
or medications (Conrad, 2015; Khullar et al., 2015). Behavioral economics applied to 
incentives can potentially enhance the initial incentive as determinants of behavior, 
influenced by incentive strength or size (Khullar et al., 2015).  
Empirical evidence indicates that complex decisions create diminished reaction to 
an overwhelming choice. As a result, a more simplistic choice can help initiate progress 
and coordination of patient care more effectively. Promoting a change in provider 
treatment behavior or in medical decision-making is the goal, especially considering that 
a subject’s proximity to a goal also impacts the level of motivation (Powers et al., 2016). 
Goals should be specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, and time defined. The closer a 
goal is perceived, the more attainable it becomes (Powers et al., 2016). Contractual 




expenditures and adding uniformity to the processes involved in delivering appropriate 
and efficient care.  
Crowding out effect. The crowding-out effect is an unintended consequence when 
determining which type and size of motivator could influence a physician’s medical 
decision-making or its processes (Kao, 2015, p. 2220). Tasks intrinsically related to 
incentives will have a negative effect on providing care in more complex care situations, 
as in the case of the chronically ill, who are subject to the crowding-out effect (Khullar et 
al, 2015). The crowd-out phenomenon is counter-productive for those innately obligated 
by profession to deliver a level of quality or comprehension of care guided by internal 
motivation of the provider (Khullar et al., 2015). According to Khullar et al. (2015), 
incentive payments are more effective when distributed in a series of small and frequent 
payments that are within the provider’s control (Conrad, 2015). Access to patient data is 
essential when immediate responsive actions are needed to adjust effectiveness and ACO 
performance access is easily obtained in an ACO setting of continuity 
Intrinsic and extrinsic motivators. Casalino et al. (2003) found that care 
management processes yielded high quality scores. These physician organization scores 
were publicly recognized and used care management processes 1.3 times more often. The 
act of being publicly acknowledged for their efforts in quality performance promotes 
intrinsic motivation, reinforcing the use of clinical processes and balancing the 
motivation sensitivity of provider performance. Behavioral economics outline intrinsic 
motivation. A challenge of the incentive is crowding out when sustainable performance is 




redesign of the health delivery system, an intrinsic motivation is expected to engage 
quality improvements, but there are concerns of negatively skewing behavior when 
incentivized with monetary gains extrinsically. A balance between intrinsic and extrinsic 
incentives is needed to alter behavior (Conrad & Perry, 2009). With strategically-
developed ACO contractual agreements, the infrastructure will define standards of 
universal clinical processes of care to assist in creating a reliable system of quality and 
continuity of care.  
Economic behavioral theory also suggests that incentives must be personally 
rewarding for altruistic providers; alternately, extrinsic rewards could reduce the level of 
internal motivation, particularly if the task to which the metric is attached has little value 
to the provider or is mundane (Abduljawad & Al-Assaf, 2011; Roland & Dudley, 2015). 
In an ACO setting, financial incentives need to directly correlate to a value-based task or 
procedure that encourages coordination and streamlined services. A performance 
framework, through shared interest and value-based incentive performance, contribute to 
a sustainable solution supported by theory. 
Application and Rationale for Theory Selection 
Reinforced by economic behavioral theory, the VBPIT supports contractual 
arrangements by defining benchmarks rewarded by incentives, encouraging quality 
improved health care with reduced expenses, and identifying motivational incentives 
sensitive to provider responses who engage them in value-based care (Conrad, 2015). The 
VBPIT theory applies to designing and reformulating efficient incentive size supported 




intrinsic motivators (Conrad, 2015). An increase in poor performance can be attributed to 
psychological hierarchies of needs, self-determination framework, over mining 
autonomy, competence, and relatedness of intrinsically-formatted motivators (Kao, 
2015). These factors contribute to the perspective of performance contingent on the 
provider’s intrinsic motivation in tasks or activities that are inherently interesting or 
cognitively challenging to the provider, the financial incentive may crowd out this 
inherent intrinsic motivation; when performance improves it is dependent on the size of 
the incentive, acting negatively in the decision-making process when ordinary tasks are 
rewarded (Kao, 2015).  
The VBPIT has been minimally applied; the theory is new and has been 
minimally utilize. Conrad introduced the theory late 2015, few applications of the theory 
have been included in any completed scholarly research to date. Conrad’s (2015) VBPIT 
has been mostly conceptual to date and has not expanded into theoretical applications. 
Evidence was provided in one study on the cost of treatment affecting the quality of care, 
specifically access to medications as a variable affecting adherence to treatment plans. By 
impacting cost and setting the costs lower, spending as a whole is reduced by using a 
default to the generic medication and value-based delivery of service options as described 
in behavioral economics (Lee et al., 2013). Defaults used in behavioral economics can 
crossover into procedures and into the coordination of care delivered in the ACO setting 
to aid in the reduction of expenditures and promoting value-episodes of care, especially 
when these activities are supported by incentives outlined in contracts. 




the use of incentives as a tool to implement quality improvements (Burwell, 2015). Given 
the behavioral component of the financial incentives’ design and structure, there is a need 
to understand that incentive size will optimally promote efficient and effective provider 
influence to advance delivery processes and behavior patterns aligning quality, value, and 
coordination of services. The internal structure of an ACO varies and this difference is 
directly correlated with inconsistent operational structure of internal clinical processes of 
the accountable care strategy that relies heavily on a number of internal and external 
variables (see Conrad, 2015). The lack of ACO structured uniformity in aligned processes 
that will perpetuate the success of a complex system of health care also correlates with 
inconsistent operational structure (Casalino et al., 2003; Nix, 2013). Both quality of 
clinical provider processes and improved decision making aimed at key contributors of 
success yield improved health outcomes, inclusive of incentive delivery processes that 
additionally influence the success of the incentives (Conrad, 2015). 
The VBPIT was chosen to guide the research and its framework, as it allows for 
the correlation of redesigned alternative payment models, with use of contractual 
requirements of the ACOs participating in the MSSP and the influences of powerful 
incentives on decision-making of the ACO provider, as well as administration. The 
study’s goal is effective formatting and alignment of financial incentive size in the 
reformed value-based APMs grounded by the VBPIT, supporting the promotion of 
comprehensive and cost-efficient care with elevated expectations and contracted 
standards of quality set by a regulating agency. Opportunity cost or countervailing the 




balance of four behavioral economic concepts: loss aversion based on defaults, crowd 
out, frequency and means of payment, and intrinsic and extrinsic motivation strategies 
(Arnold, 2016; Conrad, 2015).  
Contractual arrangements of Medicare through its shared shavings program can 
help define the payment incentive formats that will align with the cost of providing care 
at a risk to enhance the subpopulations health benefits. This is defined by the value in 
episodes of care (Conrad, 2015). Diverse incentive constructs will perform differently 
based on how value is perceived by the health care providers and without the use of soft 
autonomy, thereby encouraging provider participation in the financial incentive model. 
Behavioral economics support setting the most cost-effective option as the default in 
medical decision-making without restricting treatment options (Khullar et. al, 2015). 
Shortell (2016) broke down multiple theories chosen to understand ACO 
development and its evolution, presenting alternative perspectives not inclusive of the 
purpose and goals of this study, hence the alternate decision to use the VBPIT. With 
incentive size as the independent variable, the predictor of behavior in this previous study 
is defined as the total benchmark expenditures. The provider behavior and health 
outcomes are based on ACO performance measures. The dependent variables are acute 
care readmissions, outpatient emergency department visits, and total year spending per 
Medicare recipient. The VBPIT describes the roles of the MSSP, the incentive design, 
contractual benchmarks, provider motivation, and incentive size to aid in restructuring a 
responsive and comprehensive delivery system of care. This is applicable to an ACO 




place through contractual arrangements and by pairing incentive expectations to quality 
benchmarks (Conrad, 2015). 
Each of the study’s research questions validates the potential impact on health 
outcomes for the Medicare subpopulation. Federally-regulated contracts can be used to 
dictate structure and format of incentive payment models that identify ideal incentive 
size. Optimally, these contracts will align provider motivation and increase accountability 
through universal clinical standards of care, these standards incorporate a series of 
defaulting internal medical decision-making processes, prompting providers to follow 
recommendations of care as well as assist in medical-decision making with more 
complex situations. These processes are designed to serve the most at-risk populations, 
the unhealthy, allowing the chronically ill to receive reliable, comprehensive and 
collaborative care. Increased accountability produces aligned strategic spending and 
resource usage to reduce expenditures sustainable in a capitated or bundled payment 
option used in the ACO (Roland & Dudley, 2015). 
The components of the VBPIT have not been applied to the ACO setting or a 
federal program. The principal-agent and behavioral economic theories have been 
utilized in similarly aimed research. Behavioral economics is the source of the prospect 
theory. The prospect theory suggests that an individual, the health provider, is more 
motivated to avoid a loss or penalty than to earn a gain or reward (Torchiana et al., 2013). 
Provider motivation can be intrinsically or extrinsically inspired. Each unique provider 
perspective impacts medical decision-making or treatment behavior differently. This 




measures of quality used to quantify the provider’s behavior, further economically 
affecting stakeholders. The prospect theory is used to frame research by Torchiana et al. 
(2013) with the Massachusetts General Physician Organization (MGPO) quality incentive 
program; the incentive size was a mere 2% under a 6-month interval review of quality 
measures. The program increased incentive payments to providers by $15 million; 
yielding improved compliance and increased efficiency of processed services with a 
reduced frequency of emergency department visits (Torchiana et al., 2013).  
Werner et al. (2011) also used the same form of the prospect theory to frame their 
study on pay-for-performance incentive format and its relationship with quality 
improvement by using stronger incentives to attract the provider performance needed to 
achieve the outcomes sought. Pioneer ACO program research by Williams et al. (2015), 
based on characteristics of the ACO, shows links to health care spending of this 
subpopulation using a social action perspective in theory. This perspective promotes 
increased provider involvement in deciding quality measures that align with similar 
health outcomes.  
Larson et al. (2012) did not disclose a clear theoretical framework for their study 
on Brookings-Dartmouth private ACOs. The features of their research design imply a 
clear fit to the VBPIT with establishing contracts and the requirements of contractual 
agreements in the development of formation models for ACOs, thereby placing structural 
organization as a component in the contract. This is directly connected to the principal-
agent theory component of the VBPIT. No previous precedents had been set and no ACO 




Additionally, calling for clear and contracted processes with shared aims and connections 
to personal interests or motivations supports the potential benefits of VBPIT. 
Each research question correlates with the independent variable and with each 
dependent variable outcome. Incentive size influences ACO performance, thereby 
directly influencing the rise or fall of acute-care readmission rates, frequency of 
emergency department visits, and per capita spending of ACO MSSP beneficiaries. As 
incentive size subjectively influences provider behavior and decision-making, there is a 
behavioral economic perspective to incentive. Additionally, a contract is in place between 
the ACO and the federal government as a third-party payer through the MSSP. A 
principal-agent connection exists in the research. Benchmarks and identified quality 
expectations can be incorporated into the contract as a measure of reward and 
clarification in the metrics of quality. 
Literature Review of Variables and Concepts 
Variables quantified in the research include incentive size, per capita spending, 
outpatient ED visits, and acute readmissions of beneficiaries of ACOs participating in the 
MSSP. In order to comprehensively analyze the motivated behavior treatment changes of 
providers and facilities consistent with the quantitative research study, literature support 
is presented that relates to the constructs of ACOs engaged in a reformed APM inclusive 
of value-based incentives targeting improved quality. The roles of the three dependent 
variables are to identify a feature of quality in the measures captured in preexisting data. 
These measurements are the number of acute care readmissions, outpatient ED visits, and 




participating in the MSSP. 
Quality of Care  
The quality of health care in the United States is lacking consistency, continuity, 
and the coordination of services between health care organizations and providers (CMS, 
2015b; CMS, 2017a). Quality in health care is further impacted by the lack of 
infrastructure to support standardized processes and incentive alignment contributing to 
the low level of quality care received (Colla et al., 2016; Conrad & Perry, 2009).  
Standardizing clinical processes require physicians to forfeit a measure of autonomy in 
order for ACOs to be successful in the shift to value-based care with a streamlined team 
approach using universal clinical practices (Colla et al., 2016).  
Higher rates of readmissions and poor health outcomes correlate to a lack of 
coordinated care, and 20% of the readmissions are elderly and labeled as Medicare 
beneficiaries (Robert Wood Foundation, 2013). A recent study found no difference 
between commercial and public (i.e., MSSP and Pioneer ACO model) ACOs in 30-day 
readmission rates but instead found that ACOs increased the occurrence of follow-up care 
of the same subpopulation (Nyweide et al., 2015).  
ED visits and readmissions are costly, and hospital costs represented 32.1% of the 
gross domestic product expenditures in 2014 (Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, 
2016). ACOs are associated with lower health expenditures and less ED visits of the 
studied Medicare subpopulation (Colla et al., 2016; McWilliams et al., 2015). Modest 
declines in spending are evident within the first year of Medicare repayment models, such 




incentive payment models (Colla et al., 2016; McWilliams et al., 2015). The Institute of 
Medicine (IOM) defined quality as “the degree to which health services for individual 
and populations increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent 
with current professional knowledge” (Docteur & Berenson, 2009, p. 1). On a broader 
scale, the Agency for Health Care Quality defined quality as “…doing the right thing at 
the right time in the right way for the right person and having the best results possible: 
(Docteur & Berenson, 2009, p. 1). Maximized quality can exist but is not dependent on a 
single provider’s medical decision-making ability or behavior in treatments. This optimal 
level of quality requires an infrastructure of operations and standardized clinical 
processes to support and balance provider ethics with aligned treatment behavior and 
resource usage (Kronick et al., 2015). Quality-based processes are a vital structural 
component of an incentive model and contribute to the format of the incentive design.  
In 2013, the United States spent $7 billion on inpatient hospital costs, and 
readmission expenses for the Medicare population equaled $5.2 billion, even with a 
decrease of 13% over a span of 5 years (i.e., 2009 – 2013;  Fingar & Washington, 2015). 
Inpatient hospital stays are costly, and preventable hospital admissions in 2012 totaled 
nearly $26 billion in expenditures (Clancy, 2013). Preventable hospital admissions 
suggest that preventative or ambulatory care was not provided, due to patient delay or in 
access to care (Clancy, 2013). Many times, readmissions or admissions to an inpatient 
facility are due to a simple lack of coordinated and comprehensive care (Nyweide et al., 
2015). Medicare expenditures are projected to increase federal budgets by 1.4% by 2030 




accomplished through various methods of cost containment and resource usage strategies, 
unlike fee-for-service reimbursement methods (Epstein et al., 2014). Reduced spending 
was noted upon the realization of ACOs, presenting average reductions of 3% per 
Medicare recipient and a 2% cost savings for those with multiple chronic conditions 
(Colla et al., 2016). Researchers have suggested a potential cost savings of $26 to $48 
billion exists with integration and coordination of services, significantly reducing 
hospitalizations and ED visit expenses (O’Donnell et al., 2015).  
Coordination of care for Medicare beneficiaries with five or more chronic 
conditions resulted in a more distinct reduction of expenditures because costs related to 
these multiple conditions are two to three times more than those that have a single 
medical condition (O’Donnell et al., 2015). Changes in expenditures on procedures, 
imaging services, and tests contribute to lower spending on outpatient care (McWilliams, 
Landon, & Chernew, 2013). These changes can be attributed to the use of an Alternative 
Quality Contract (AQC) utilized by DHHS (McWilliams et al., 2013). After 2 years of 
AQC implementation, there was approximately a 66% reduction in health-related 
expenditures for Medicare recipients (McWilliams et al., 2013). Song et al. (2014) found 
that use of AQCs, such as those used by the CMS, improved quality and reduced 
spending by up to 9.1%. Contractual arrangements through federal programs have 
provided additional methods of cost reduction or slowing for vulnerable Medicare 
beneficiaries. The ACO strategy has lowered Medicare spending by $417 million since 
its implementation, reducing readmissions resulting in fewer costly hospitalizations 




The structural characteristics of incentives need to be reformulated into an 
efficient model with short reimbursement cycles linked to meaningful measures of 
quality, payable directly to providers (Fisher et al., 2012). The structural component of 
the financial incentive contributes to compliance of the metric and the provider’s 
motivation level (Torchiana et al., 2013). The IOM (2001) highlighted that the existing 
structure of the U.S. health care system is a fragmented obstacle, reversing the weak level 
of health care quality provided in the United States with much needed accountability, 
transparency, and efficiency (Peterson et al., 2006; Salisbury-Afshar, 2012). As a result, 
the CMS-devised APMs use financial incentives as a strategic hub. This new strategy 
assists in altering provider treatment behavior in response to the country’s “triple aim” of 
enhanced quality of care indicated by improved health outcomes, reduced spending by 
strategizing resource usage, and efficiency in the delivery of care (Siddiqui & Berkowitz, 
2013; Vogus & Singer, 2016). 
ACOs and Incentive Size 
To offset the expenses generated from the regional and local chronically ill 
subpopulation, the country’s economic health goal is to create a shared risk pool of health 
care beneficiaries for both sick and healthy consumers. This risk pool will be manageable 
at a geographically-specific level (Teitelbaum, Riegelman & Wilensky, 2015). In an 
attempt to prevent adverse selection, the number of young and healthy consumers (aged 
18-34), with health insurance, must increase by at least 40% within the first 2 years of the 
ACA’s implementation. Only 28% of this subpopulation was participating in the 




federal programs (Teitelbaum et al., 2015).  
Identifying ACO infrastructure qualities and outlining the characteristics of an 
operational financial payment model assist in determining effective applications of 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of the provider and the facility. The ACA of 2010 
expanded ACO initiatives and the DHHS was required to promote a shared savings 
program to respond to the increasing expenses of the Medicare fee-for-service methods 
(Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, 2013). ACOs became the 
instrument to achieve the triple goal of enhancing quality, lowering expenditures, and 
improving health outcomes of a defined population (Vogus & Singer, 2016). With the 
recent implementation of ACOs, the CMS delivered three alternative payment options 
utilizing financial incentives. Value of care was emphasized in contrast to volume of 
services, patients, or procedures, an emphasis intended to catalyze elevated quality. This 
program implemented three methodologies of ACO design: Advanced Payment, Pioneer 
ACO, and MSSP models (ASTHO, 2013).  
The APM provides an up-front payment disbursed to contract ACOs, but also 
places a benchmark on a number of quality-related outcomes and provider behavior 
(CMS, 2013). If the goal or outcome measure is not met, the ACO and its health care 
providers absorb a loss and a portion of the advanced payment is returned to the 
government (CMS, 2013). The Pioneer ACO model is the second option of repayment 
models formulated by the CMS and it is a more aggressive form of the MSSPs two-sided 
model with greater risks attached to shared savings arrangements (Kessler et al., 2015). 




between two incentive tracks (Kessler et al., 2015).  
ACOs deliver integrated and coordinated care among multiple provider specialties 
with access to diverse procedures and services, an approach which can avoid waste and 
align continuity of care (Burwell, 2015). The ACO setting nurtures a collective team 
approach to health care rewarding performance through the delivery of comprehensive 
services. When ACOs are economically successful, there is alignment between quality 
and performance. Theoretical alignment is expected to produce improved health 
outcomes to a subpopulation with evidence-based statistical support of incentive level or 
saving value effectiveness, as defined among a set of variables, however at best mixed 
results were produced on whether rewarding providers improves health outcomes (James, 
2012). The aim of the organizational structure of ACOs and health care market is to 
impact quality and expenditures of resources specifically associated with serving the 
Medicare population. An empirical review of existing studies targeting performance 
shows no improved or positive health outcomes as a result of incentive payment usage or 
size. The size of incentive could not be determined to improved quality of care (Scott et 
al., 2016). In ACOs contracted with CMS under the MSSP, the targeted population is 
Medicare beneficiaries.  
The shift to volume-based payment model value has taken the form of shared 
savings or bundled payment options, creating a competitive market that has the potential 
to save money through the use of contracted quality expectations as an ACO 
accountability factor. Quality levels also improved when providers were incentivized to 




(Lemark et al., 2015). Reduced spending changes need to be sustainable with tiered 
incentives to specific variables linked to increased quality. These findings mirror the 
analysis of new value-based programs, which bundle payment and look at reimbursable 
episodes of care, especially those inclusive of multiple service areas. This approach also 
works as a patient-centered collaborative effort (Lemark et al., 2015). A study performed 
by Colla et al. (2017) tested the effects of Medicare contracted ACOs on spending and 
utilization costs of clinically vulnerable beneficiaries. Colla et al.’s (2017) study 
measured several variables and variations of them, including quarterly per capita 
expenditures, hospital usage and ED visits and 30-day readmission rates similar to the 
variables inclusive of this dissertation. Findings indicated minimal reductions in hospital 
(resource expenditures) and ED usage yielding a moderate reduction in expenditures for 
those defined as having five or more chronic conditions, the clinically vulnerable. Similar 
contractual findings are seen in Song et al. (2014), when spending slowed with use of the 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts Alternative Quality Contract, with greater 
savings generated by those ACOs spending the most. This savings and reduced service 
utilization was primarily generated by the setting of care and clinical procedures ordered, 
linking performance to patterns of care given provider decision-making behavior (Song et 
al., 2014). 
ACOs act as a catalyst to provide stronger quality incentive models, in a 
coordinated environment to accomplish components of the country's health goals (Conrad 
& Perry, 2009). The objective of ACOs is to hold providers and administrators 




and improved health outcomes. These contracted ACOs potentially serve the patient 
through universal clinical standards embedded in operational design and universal 
clinical processes, policy defining meaningful quality measures, and justifiable 
benchmarks within a collaborative approach of patient-centered care. O’Donnell et al. 
(2015) found that quality improvement programs like the ACO model, actually reduced 
utilization of services, thus slowing or reducing expenses and improving health outcomes 
in preventative and primary care for those with chronic conditions. 
ACO and alternative payment models. The Patient Protection and ACA of 
2010) began transforming the health care industry by improving transparency and 
accountability in health care delivery. New strategies are emerging that can offset 
contractual, standardized clinical processes and encourage effective medical decision-
making behavior through economic payment reform, especially if supported by a robust 
incentive size (Fisher et al., 2012; Spencer, Gaskin, & Roberts, 2013). Without federal 
regulation to control procedures and treatment  approaches, the system depends on the 
provider's behavior to act in the best interest of the patient (the principal) and 
ACO/provider (the agent) to create an environment promoting incentive neutrality 
(Berenson & Rice, 2015, p. 2156).  
ACOs are relatively new to the public health care arena. The transition from 
volume to value-based care incentivized payment models is also new and is a by-product 
of the ACA of 2010 meant to improve quality and coordinate services while better 
managing costs and resource usage, ultimately reducing health care costs per person. The 




and the design of alternative payment methods using incentives and to provide the federal 
government with access to quantitative, reliable data to measure, monitor, and reward 
quality.  
Alternative payment models using effective incentives have the potential to limit 
spending, yielding a shared savings for directly reducing usage of resources, but with a 
negative impact on beneficiaries, as this constraint of resources could influence access 
(Nyweide et al., 2015). Nyweide et al. (2015) research also used a multiple regression 
analysis of Pioneer ACO model beneficiaries compared to traditional fee-for-service 
Medicare program models to improve quality of care delivered in 2012 and 2013. 
Findings of this particular study were telling. Pioneer ACOs slowed its spending by -
$35.62 per member in year one and decreased by $11.18 in Year 2. These small decreases 
combined accounted for a slowing of $280 million in 2012 and $105 million in 2012, in 
Medicare spending (Nyweide et al., 2015). Since its inception in 2011, ACO programs 
have reduced Medicare spending by $417 million. Lowered hospital readmission rates of 
8% (2012-2013) are directly related to cost and a total of 150,000 less readmissions for 
this chronically ill subpopulation (Vogus & Singer, 2016). There were also noticeable 
changes in the usage of tests, procedures, and imaging, all of which impact spending and 
resource utilization (Nyweide et al., 2015).  
Focusing on spending adjustments and trends, McWilliams et al. (2015) studied 
CMS’s Pioneer ACO program in its first and second year of implementation. The savings 
variable was compared between ACOs participating in the program and a control group 




program was associated with moderate reductions in health-related spending of the 
Medicare population. Spending was lower when baselines were used to gauge quality 
(McWilliams et al., 2015). The Pioneer ACO program provides a larger incentive size 
and structure compared to the MSSP 2% incentive (McWilliams et al., 2015). The 
research of McWilliams et al. (2015) helped users to understand how baseline spending is 
related to savings and provided insight on the regulatory components of financial 
incentives as a means to control spending, using the behavioral economic concept of 
default options (Conrad, 2015). 
MSSP ACO. The MSSP serves as a contractual arrangement setting standards of 
quality to improve the value of care. A value-based payment model, such as shared 
savings, with adequately motivating incentive size, contributes to the development of 
internal processes that consistently produce increased levels of quality of delivered care 
in a service coordination setting. The MSSP requires a minimum of 5,000 enrollees 
participating in a fee-for-service payment arrangement that follow nationally-recognized 
quality measures outlined by the AHRQ focused on the patient’s experience, care 
coordination and continuity, preventative health care, and at-risk populations (Kessler et 
al., 2015). The MSSP offers two tracks with diverging risk levels. Track 1 is a one-sided 
model with small gains to be earned and no penalties applied. Track 2 presented a two-
sided model with potential for both shared savings or gains and possible losses based on a 
defined structure of benchmarks and quality-specific variables (CMS, 2015). Track one is 
only an option in the first year of the contract, but organizations can contract with either 




In determining the shared savings or loss of an ACO participating in Track 2 of 
the MSSP, 33 quality measures are calculated by domain scores and assigned a weight to 
determine the ACO shared savings and/or losses (CMS, 2015). The quality measures 
serve as a benchmark of evolving quality, phasing in increased and refined benchmarks in 
the ACO contracts second and third participation year, an action aimed at the two-sided 
model (CMS, 2015). The domains include an equal distribution of weight between the 
patient/caregiver experience, care coordination/ patient safety, preventative health, and 
at-risk population domains (CMS, 2015).  
Track 2 of the CMS MSSP elevates the risk. In the ownership of ACO services 
and accountability is crucial. In an exchange for a higher rate of savings, more risk is 
assumed and is dependent of the benchmark identified as meaningful and useful. These 
benchmarks are based on the Medicare’s fee-for-service data. Additionally, the minimum 
savings rates are applied, with consideration of the national growth rate as a contributor 
(CMS, 2015). Incentive size of the MSSP Track 2 is set at a flat 2%. The loss sharing 
limit in Year 1 is 5%, in Year 2 7.5%, and 10% in Year 3 (CMS, 2015). Quality points 
are allocated based on a sliding scale based on a percentile measure between 90% and 
100%, for a maximum of two quality points. Each benchmark quality measure is assigned 
a point value based on the percentile of meeting the performance goal (CMS, 2015). In 
2015, the MSSP provided two tracks, each with different incentive values rewarding 
ACOs and providers that met the outlined quality benchmarked goals. Track 1 offers a 




Track 2 operates at a straight unwavering 2% with stricter accountability of a provider 
medical decision-making (CMS, 2015). 
Now that ACO MSSP contracts are transitioning out of the 3 year participation 
arrangement, CMS has extended and revised the infrastructure, forming another Track 3 
option, with new reconciliation calculations to balance the financial risk rates (CMS, 
2016). Benchmarks have been adjusted for the 2017 performance year; as benchmarks 
are met, and new and challenging goals evolve annually. The sliding scale will also adjust 
at the 99
th
 percentile, instead of the 90
th
 percentile for per capita spending, shifting from 
national to regional growth rates to align spending more accurately (CMS, 2016). 
The MSSP offers a modest 2% incentive, which is comparable to other alternative 
payment models developed under the ACA (Jha, 2013). Chronic care and vulnerable, or 
at risk populations, such as the Medicare population, emerge in some studies as the 
costliest subpopulation. One that utilizes health care resources at a higher rate, thereby 
spending more (Casalino et al., 2003; Colla et al., 2016; Gu et al., 2014). The finding 
implies a greater risk to the Medicare ACO with the potential to reduce spending without 
sacrificing quality, suggesting a systematic reform of the country’s existing health 
delivery system (McWilliams et al., 2015). Medicare’s reformed incentive model was 
related to slight drops in spending linked to inpatient and outpatient hospital usage 
(O’Donnell et al., 2015). Consequentially, the savings variable was significantly higher 
for the chronically ill population (Colla et al., 2016). 
Colla et al. (2016) studied the influence of physician involvement and the 




whether or not the enhancement of quality and controlled costs should be applied to the 
organizational structure of the ACO. They further indicated that there were decreased ED 
visits and inpatient care with the implementation of Medicare’s ACO initiative, which 
was designed to combat excessive and wasteful spending. Taken from the National 
Survey of Accountable Care Organizations, the data were derived from October 2012 
through May 2013 showed a drop of 12.2 ED events per 1,000 beneficiaries (Colla et al., 
2106). Subsequently, a greater drop was observed in the chronically ill subpopulation, 
indicative of the Medicare ACO population, with 16.5 fewer ED visits (Colla et al., 
2016).  
Using enrollment data and socioeconomic factors, Epstein et al. (2014) studied 
254 ACOs participating in the Pioneer ACO initiative and Shared Savings Programs in 
2013. This study analyzed organizational infrastructure features, quality performance, 
and the difference between affiliated and nonaffiliated hospitals of ACO and non-ACO 
beneficiaries. Hospitals assess health outcomes related to quality, including readmission 
rates and risk-adjusted mortality rates for critical diagnoses (Epstein et al, 2014). Baseline 
patterns were found to have a positive impact on quality and benchmark adherence, but 
no difference in quality was found between participating and nonparticipating ACO 
hospitals and only mild differences existed in patient demographics and socioeconomic 
variables (Epstein et al., 2014). Nyweide et al. (2015) performed a multiple regression 
analysis of fee-for-service beneficiaries that aligned with Pioneer ACOs. Compared with 




ACO program experienced greater control of spending and resource utilization than non-
ACO beneficiaries. 
Incentive size. The size of the incentive is expected to predict the provider’s level 
of influence and motivation by improving the consumer’s delivery of quality care through 
coordinated services, enhanced decision-making, and efficient care. Incentive size has not 
been a focal theme in research and it has been studied even less in correlation with MSSP 
ACOs. Influence of incentive size on MSSP and other single program that impacts 
quality changes in the health care system has not been researched (Werner et al., 2011). 
Few studies have filtered their foci to the MSSP ACO contractual arrangements and the 
alignment of incentive size. Contractual alignment struggles to consistently balance 
motivation and provider behavior through the application of incentivized rewards (Scott 
et al., 2016).  
The incentive size needs to be robust enough to alter administrative actions and 
outline consistent internal processes, provider performance, and behavior alignment 
(James, 2012). The size of the incentive can affect the allure of the incentive and 
therefore, alter the provider’s behavior to align quality and delivery of care (Bardach et 
al., 2013). Provider medical decision-making and treatment behavior is dependent on the 
personal values of the physician. The motivation within the incentive size is also unique 
to internal or external factors of the environment context in the delivery of care (Conrad, 
Vaughn, Grembowski, & Marcus-Smith, 2016). 
Incentive factors.  External factors are uncontrollable features of the economic 




the operations of an organization, such as type and structure of the ACO (Conrad et al., 
2016). Changing internal ACO processes can occur if financial incentives depicted in the 
MSSP impact a significant portion of the patients it cares for by aligning provider 
treatment behaviors with an effective and mindful use of incentives (Conrad et al., 2016). 
Therefore, the problem focus involves several components. These components are the 
influence of quality-aligned incentive sizes on providers, standardized and contractual 
processes of care for the population to ensure improved health outcomes, and control 
over excessive and wasteful spending by strategically applying quality metrics to 
performance measures. 
There is no guarantee that incentives small or large will alter provider behavior 
(Scott et al., 2016). Layton and Ryan (2015) failed to find any association between 
improved quality and providers earning double bonuses. The unforeseen consequences of 
the bulky incentive actually produced better insurance plan options for consumers. 
Torchiana et al. (2013) research on the Massachusetts General Physicians Organization’s 
quality incentive program showed two percent of the physicians’ income was from the 
value of the incentives used. At a meager two percent or less, size was a contributing 
factor to the failure of the pay-for-performance program. This was simply not 
competitively robust enough to motivate the targeted behavior. Although the structure of 
the incentive was also important, other characterizing factors also played a role 
(Torchiana et al., 2013). At the risk of the crowding-out effect, stronger incentives could 
theoretically dissolve a shared savings, but could also induce large savings in ACOs 




goals of provider engagement and consolidation of power in the market. Additionally, 
there is apprehension that stronger incentives will motivate unethical or promote 
unwanted behavior, instead of its intended goal of coordination of care delivery, 
improved health outcomes, and controlled expenditures. It is suggested that large 
incentives will be needed to capture the attention of the provider, and increase quality and 
improve health outcomes (Roland & Dudley, 2015). 
Financial Incentives and Organizational Performance 
The ACO value-based payment models utilize incentives to modify behavior and 
these models have the potential to lower costs and improve the level of quality of care 
delivered (Fisher et al., 2012). Multiple types of financial incentives are used in public 
and private health insurance plans, but they lack regulation, which must be levied to 
ensure the consistency of universal quality of care. There are two goals of the incentives: 
to motivate on-going improved performance and to incur a significant effect on provider 
treatment behavior (Abduljawad & Al-Assaf, 2011).  
There is a limited focus of research on quality and financial incentives. Overall, 
studies have lacked consistent results and have been unfocused on ACO settings, primary 
care, or the chronically ill. Most studies have targeted primarily hospitals and insurance 
types (James, 2012; Scott et al., 2016; Spencer et al., 2013; Werner et al., 2012). 
Salisbury-Afshar’s (2012) research posed questions as to whether financial incentives 
improve the quality of care delivered in the primary care setting. Insufficient evidence in 
Salisbury-Afshar's research led to an inconclusive relationship regarding whether or not 




studies, six had moderately positive effects on quality and a single study found no effects.  
Researchers found that structural features of the incentive payment model used by 
private and public insurers also affect the quality of care provided and provider behavior 
delivered (Collet et al., 2011; Spencer et al., 2013). Structure comes in two forms when 
considering financial incentives, the design of the incentive and the defining 
characteristics of the reward defined by the incentive model. Structure refers to how 
incentive-based payment programs will reimburse and the correlative formula for savings 
and loss of that stimulus. The incentive structural design should include meaningful 
measures of quality, effectively motivating provider behavior to align with the incentive 
value and avoid unintended consequences in ethics and impact (Jha, 2013). A secondary 
balance is the disbursement of rewards (incentives) based on a collective team-approach 
model of care coordination for health services among multiple specialties. Conrad and 
Perry’s (2009) article discusses the value-based incentive design as a conceptual 
framework. They also suggest that a more comprehensive, well-defined incentive design 
and infrastructure would have significant potential to elevate the level of quality of care, 
more so than only using traditional pay for performance incentives (Conrad & Perry, 
2009; Fisher et al., 2012). 
Ten percent of the reviewed studies on quality and health outcomes need to align 
metrics and incentive program models to generate valid results (Torchiana et al., 2013). 
Weak incentives lead to uninterested and unmotivated providers participating in 
contracted goals. Nevertheless, the incentive's value must be appealing to the subjective 




(Abduljawad & Al-Assaf, 2011). Incentive value contributes strategically to producing 
enhanced quality, through consistent and cost-conscious medical decisions delivered to 
the ACOs subpopulation.  
Jha (2013) revealed that incentives need to be rationally designed, targeting 
diverse settings and internal operational structures. A savings of 3.4% was found for 
quarterly performance and spending. The AQC organized through Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of Massachusetts was associated with less spending but did not produce reliable 
quality (McWilliams et al., 2013).  
The early performance of the MSSP was studied by McWilliams et al. (2016) 
using Medicare claims from 2009 to 2013. Performance and differences in spending 
patterns were compared through ACO contracts; variables included ACO infrastructure, 
baseline spending, and dual ACO insurance carriers (private and public) contracted in 
performance year. Medicare spending was reduced in Year 1, but was inconsistent in the 
following years’ beneficiary expenditures. According to McWilliams et al. savings was 
more prevalent in independent primary care group ACOs compared to hospital integrated 
ACO groups. Results showed improved performance was associated with ACO MSSP 
contracts on some quality benchmarks. 
Comfort, Shortell, Rodriguez, and Colla (2018) studied performance of three 
ACO types participating in the MSSP; physician-led, integrated and hybrid. Their 
research compared quality, spending, and odds of earning an incentive bonus. No 
significant differences were found between the ACO MSSP structure and performance 




type as a result of the research performed on data from the National Survey of ACOs 
(Comfort et al., 2018).  
Pay for Performance 
The research problem focuses on improved quality as it relates to provider 
treatment behavior and decision-making directly correlates with pay for performance 
(P4P) incentive models of public programs in place as reformed payment strategies. 
Quality has been the focus of several studies linked to P4P models supporting value-
based care. Bardach et al. (2013) performed a mixed effects logistic regression using a 
cluster of patients to determine the effect of P4P incentive and the quality improvement 
initiative in a small medical office with access to electronic medical records. The usage 
of the P4P incentives delivered weak improvements of clinical processes and health 
outcomes (Bardach et al., 2013). In an environment that traditionally delivers no reward, 
yet applies loss or punishment to errors, the P4P incentive system has produced positive 
effects on provider behavior, implying a systematic flaw within incentive structure 
(Abduljawad & Al-Assaf, 2011; Peterson et al., 2006). However, incentives differ in the 
strength of size given the monetary value of the incentive. Influence is varying based on 
providers values and ethics, as well as intrinsic motivations to perform their job well 
culminating into the provider's behavior in medical decision-making (Rodwin, 2004).  
The goal of the P4P model is to improve measures specific to quality and 
efficiency of care, including the reduction of excessive costs as a value-based model 
rewards providers or facilities for meeting contracted performance measures 




research is challenged by small sample sizes, the variability of data further limited by 
setting, incentive size, specific conditions and disease focus (Emmert, Eijkenaar, Kemter, 
Esslinger & Schoffski, 2012; Layton & Ryan, 2015; Scott et al., 2016).  
Salisbury-Afshar (2012) questioned whether P4P financial incentives improve the 
quality of care delivered in the primary care setting. Insufficient evidence in Salisbury-
Afshar’s research neither supports nor denies that improved quality occurs with use of 
financial incentives in an empirical review of seven studies, six had moderately positive 
effects on quality, and a single study found no effects.  
Applying metrics of quality to performance provides enhanced health outcomes 
with little evidence on the cost-effectiveness of P4P incentive methods, supporting the 
need to find scholarly connections to pertinent quality measures directly correlate to 
health outcomes and related expenses (Meacock, Kristensen, & Sutton, 2014).  
Meacock et al. (2014) found that incentives produced statistically significant reductions 
of mortality rates and length of stay days (LOS) of inpatient care, due to the shorter 
LOS’s, savings increased but incentive effectiveness lacks strength to promote enhanced 
provider behavior. 
ACOs and Performance 
Shaping and aligning financial incentive model design to be responsive to 
changes in real time is vital in the operational success of an ACOs infrastructure, further 
improving quality by implementing standardize processes with a competitively appealing 
incentive size to motivate provider treatment behavior (Kronick et al., 2015). The effect 




price effect and the crowding out level; however, when the incentive is too great, it 
becomes disproportionate and can conflict with cognitive medical making abilities of the 
provider. However, the use of penalties as a tool counteracts this effect (Arnold, 2016; 
Kao, 2015). With use of the VBPIT, a robust incentive will ensure that provider 
intentions appeal ethically to deliver health care with the appropriate level of attention, 
optimizing the resources and applying a base of expectations to support the operational 
structure of the ACO influencing its performance (Conrad, 2015; Kao, 2015). Scott et 
al.(2016) research reviewed 22 of 44 schemes that reported incentives size bonuses and 
monetary penalties for unreached quality benchmarks. The regression model showed no 
relationship between incentive size and positive health outcomes, yet the authors provide 
valid points for this unexpected result (Scott et al., 2016). Influencing factors directly or 
indirectly affecting quality surround methodological limitations, inconsistent incentive 
design or size, and the lack of quantitative academic rigor (Scott et al., 2016). The factors 
contributing to the likelihood or probability of the method or scheme have a significant 
effect, factors which include rules of incentive use, scheme development, existing quality 
improvement initiatives and public reporting (Scott et al., 2016).  
Market factors linked to financial performance of ACOs participating in the 
Medicare APM programs were examined by Ouayogode, Colla, and Lewis (2017) using 
the same CMS database used in this dissertation. A number of infrastructure factors and 
program components were studied including but not limited to quality and standard 
process improvements, CMS benchmarks, physician performance management, 




2017). The study’s two focused outcomes of performance are per capita savings and 
shared savings incentive payments. It was found that incentive size and larger 
benchmarks generated larger shared savings, additionally none of the infrastructure 
factors or ACO characteristics was significantly linked to either of the outcomes 
measured; organizational infrastructure cannot predict performance. Findings suggest that 
prior experience with risk-based contracts did show savings, the ability and knowledge of 
the contractual model impacted performance and adherence to the program (Ouayogode 
et al., 2017). 
Spending and benchmark targets were a focal point in Ouayogode et al. (2017) 
study also linking Medicare claims data of 250 MSSP or Pioneer ACO contracts in 2012 
or 2013. Correlating with findings of McWilliams et al. (2016), Rose, Zaslavsky, and 
McWilliams (2016) also found little saving beyond year one of either APM program. 
Rose et al. compared spending patterns of ACO patients and non-ACO patients. 
Sensitivity of benchmarks is clear in the findings found variations in spending across all 
groups but the per capita expenditure patterns of the two studied groups was found to be 
similar. Rose et al. results imply a larger transition of benchmark methodology is needed, 
supporting national preset benchmarks as opposed to the rebasing mechanism currently; 
predetermined benchmarks would be more effective.  
One study used hospitals as the setting which focused on reformed incentives, 
offering hospitals an opportunity to earn the incentives and in return these hospitals had 
the largest performance-based improvements (Werner et al., 2011). Werner et al. (2011) 




improvements in performance. Incentives that are considered too small will not 
encourage effective provider motivation. Only those incentives with a suitable size will 
alter the behavior of the provider to promote improved care (Jha, 2013). Layton and Ryan 
(2015) link the behavioral economic components of the VBPIT. This is an indication that 
large financial incentives motivate heightened performance when standardized 
assessments and processes are applied and bound by contractual arrangements. In 
comparison to an approach completely lacking incentives, small incentives also resulted 
in poor performance, an outcome that behavioral economics and the VBPIT both predict 
(Layton & Ryan, 2015).  
Every author approaches the problem of consistent quality of care in health care 
differently based on perspective, methodology, and theory. The strengths and weaknesses 
are acknowledged as a means to probe justification of a study’s design, method, structure, 
validity, reliability, and theoretical frame. Nyweide et al. (2015) presented data on 
Pioneer ACO model as opposed to the MSSP, theoretically implying the ACO model will 
reduce costs and uses based on data from 2012 and 2013, the start of the ACO 
implementation. With regard to achieving maximized sustainability in a program, there is 
little to no evidence to determine the most effective incentive design, or the nature of 
optimal reward size, definitions (flat or tiered), quality alignment, and payment 
distribution (Meacock et al., 2014). Torchiana et al. (2013) studied incentive influence on 
hospital-based primary care practices that implemented defined processes promoting 
access and linking incentives to lower ED visits. Results of the incentive influence on 




care patients between 2009 and 2010, but within an overall decrease of 18% in that same 
temporal allotment (Torchiana et al., 2013).  
McWilliams et al. (2013) used Medicare claims data from 2009 (pre-ACA). Its 
aim was CPT’s evaluation and management postacute care visits. Because the study 
focused its population on ACO Medicare, the findings can be aligned with readmissions 
data unrelated to the MSSP. Primary care visits researched by Salisbury-Afshar (2012) 
focused on quality of care delivered in the primary care setting. They found that when 
incentives are used to enhance provider behavior, quality is influenced. Salisbury-Afshar 
found little correlation between improved quality and incentives in the literature-based 
data search without focus on a single program. However, because the data were 
consistent with types of incentives that have improved care, such as patient population 
features and the characteristics of the provider delivering care, the study does offer 
insight into potential financial incentive structures.  
Quality linked to incentives in a P4P strategy was the theme of several studies 
(James 2012; Meacock et al., 2014; Werner et al., 2011). These studies contained no 
correlations to VBPIT, ACOs or MSSPs. Colla et al.’s (2016) study aimed at ACO 
contracts specifically correlating with the performed research and defining characteristics 
were “accountable” quality and expenses of clinically vulnerable patients, aligned with 
the study’s ACO subpopulation of Medicare beneficiaries. McWilliams et al. (2013) 
studied the commercial ACO setting under an alternative quality contract and the ACOs 
association with reduced spending, enhanced quality for Medicare beneficiaries and 




incentive size and infrastructure to advance health care quality and lower expenditures for 
a clinically vulnerable population experiencing elevated occurrence of chronic 
conditions. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Several emerging themes surface in the literature review associated with ACO 
performance and incentive size, incentive design and operational infrastructure. 
Supported by Kao (2015) and Conrad’s VBPIT (2015), incentive design must 
intrinsically align the size of the incentive which varies based on payment mechanism; 
fee-for service, capitated, bundled or value-based payment to produce higher quality of 
care. Balanced incentives are not just a one-size-fits all payment solution. Each payment 
mechanism varies in its functional alignment and application to the financial incentive, 
pairing the incentive to the delivery environment requires sliding payment strategies to 
produce the most effective payment mechanism (Conrad, 2015). Nevertheless, payment 
mechanism is not in the scope of this study. The scope of this study specifically tests the 
value-based payment mechanism as applied to the MSSP via the CMS, as this is the 
emerging payment trend among federal APMs currently utilized in the delivery of care 
(Burns, 2103). The MSSP has a shared-savings or bundled payment concept of 
incentivized behavior that reinforces services through a team-based approach to ACOs.  
Furthermore, undermining the provider’s abilities and autonomy leads to inferior 
performance (Kao, 2015). Typically, the supply and demand balance shows that incentive 
payments improve performance, the crowding out occurrence functions atypically on 




(Kao, 2015). Correlating counterparts of design and structure support a comprehensive 
operational infrastructure through the alignment of clinical processes vital in the 
development of an effective payment reform strategy sustaining a successful ACO design 
(Fisher et al., 2012). Additionally, the Pioneer and MSSP APMs utilized in ACOs are 
improving quality through targeted health outcomes which also enhanced infrastructure 
and applied incentive initiatives (O’Donnell et al., 2015). According to Rose et al. (2016), 
after dissolving the current MSSP benchmark rebasing method, provider incentives 
would strengthen provider motivation through targeted provider-decision making 
behavior that reduces costs and induces savings. 
The crowding out concept of undermining intrinsic motivation when extrinsic 
influence supersedes the outcome, the application of the phenomenon has not been 
studied in ACO providers (Kao, 2015). The proper extrinsic incentive size balanced with 
intrinsic motivation promotes improved quality through universal clinical processes 
embedded in the ACOs infrastructure that rewards efficient provider treatment behavior 
and complex decision making essential in developing a successful ACO (Fisher et al., 
2012; Kronick et al., 2015; Lee et al., 2013; Petersen et al., 2006). Effective payment 
incentive structure further ensures comprehensive and coordinated services that result in 
improved quality of care. Additionally, studies to date focusing on incentive value have 
only analyzed percentages not dollar amount. The presented literature reveals a lack of 
knowledge and empirical support on the relationship between MSSP’s incentive size and 
ACO performance (quality) as a method to improve utilization of resources and per 




participant population. There are no existing literature correlations between the ACO 
performance and the variables chosen. Scott et al. (2016) and Werner et al. (2012) stated 
that no study has examined the differences and the impact of incentive size within a 
single payment program, such as the MSSP, directly affects quality improvement. 
Conclusions can be deducted in relation to ACO performance and quality of care 
from the reviewed literature, despite of the deficiency in incentive size research and 
MSSP APM correlations to ACO success. Health care spending slowed with use of 
Medicare’s ACO strategies, quality levels were inconsistent among this same population 
of beneficiaries, and only short-term effects are evident of ACOs spending trends 
(Nyweide et al., 2015; Scott et al., 2016; Williams et al., 2014; Williams et al., 2015). 
Basic incentive design is not inclusively or comprehensively researched, many studies 
have reported that incentive models lacked details on clarity of incentive size, threshold 
payments, and rules of use of the incentive (Scott et al., 2016).  
Researchers found mixed and unfavorable outcomes when attempting to 
determine if a relationship existed between pay-for-performance rewards and quality of 
care (James, 2012; Layton & Ryan, 2015). Savings occurred between 2012 and 2013 
under the Pioneer ACO program (value-based payment scheme) and in Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of Massachusetts’ AQC; a commercial ACO however, sustainability of reliable 
quality is unknown (McWilliams et al., 2013; Nyweide et al., 2015). Behavioral 
economics has not been significantly applied to physician performance and decision-
making when using financial incentives, meaning the extent to which incentive design 




question (Khullar et al., 2015). 
 Limited research has focused on rewarding behavior with the appropriate 
incentive size in place to produce improved ACO performance, but is linked to provider 
performance (Collet, 2011). Results of the research have the potential to contribute to the 
VBPIT and in the balance of incentive size to optimize health outcomes, controlling 
expenses, and maintain reliably universal quality of care (Kao, 2015).  
Knowledge of behavioral economics, as applied in the VBPIT applied to the 
potential crowding out of provider behavior, adds quantitatively to the application of a 
successful ACO infrastructure, financial incentive design, and reformulated collaborative 
care. A sturdily-balanced incentive strategy can produce effective changes in provider 
treatment behaviors and promote collaborative decision-making.  This balance sets the 
foundation for standard universal clinical processes outlined and regulated by contractual 




Chapter 3: Research Methods 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the misalignment between financial 
incentives and ACO performance. Apprehensions lie in the ability of financial incentives 
to efficiently stimulate and motivate providers to make consumer-conscious decisions in 
the continuity and coordination of practices that strengthen the quality of health care. My 
overall intent with the study was to determine whether there is a relationship between the 
financial incentive size and the quality-defined performance of an ACO contracted to 
serve the Medicare population. A gap in knowledge exists in the empirical literature 
surrounding APMs, more specifically financial incentive models developed by CMS 
meant to control costs and improve quality.  
All existing studies aimed at financial incentive strength have applied a 
percentage approach to determine impact on provider behavioral/performance changes. 
To date, there have been few studies that have tested the incentive value impact on 
received dollar amounts of the incentivized bonus. With an additional gap in the lack of 
quantifiable data in this area, whether the value of the incentive size used in the CMS 
programs is influential enough to alter the performance of a provider and improve the 
provider’s ability to streamline patient care remained to be determined.  
In this chapter, I will describe the developed methodology I used to examine a 
defined sample of ACOs engaged in the reformed incentive structure models 
implemented by the CMS under the ACA (2010) I used secondary data for this study. I 




hypotheses, targeting incentive size as a predictor of ACO performance in several 
regression models.  
Quantitative research uses deductions reliant on statistical analysis to determine 
the significance of a tested relationship between the predictor and response variables (see 
Creswell, 2009). My theoretical framework of the VBPIT supported the research 
questions and hypotheses crafted to focus on explaining the phenomenon examined in the 
study. I tested the hypotheses to determine the significance of the data collected via the 
public access files from the CMS of the MSSP ACOs. While analyzing the data for 
statistical significance, I used analytical tools to assist in determining relationship 
strength and the probability of Type I and II errors (see Field, 2013).  
Research Design and Rationale 
In this study, I used a quantitative approach, applying a cross-sectional design (or 
correlational design) to the research in an attempt to describe the potential associations 
between the presented variables. A quantitative strategy provides an objective perspective 
of the use of secondary data in a study as applied in a correlational design (Creswell, 
2015). This design does not require random assignment in sampling because the 
independent variable is not manipulated (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). The ACO 
environment was uncontrolled and data are collected once annually by the CMS (CMS, 
2017). The defining characteristics of this study aligned best with a cross-sectional design 
(Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). 
I hypothesized the independent (or predictor) variable in this study, incentive size, 




were acute care readmissions, outpatient ED visits, and total spending per year in ACOs 
functioning under the MSSP. The control (or potential confounding) variables for the 
research included organizational and population characteristics: ACOs contracted with 
participating hospitals, ACO size, Medicare recipients 85 years old and older, and 
African American and Hispanic populations. The health disparities of these two racial 
groups are elevated comparatively. Extraneous variables are controlled for in the linear 
regression equations to avoid alternative explanation of the results (Russell, 2010). 
Upstream determinants are defined as components of an individual’s social environment; 
this includes the socio-economic status that essentially influences a person’s behavior, 
disease prevalence, and overall health status (Gehlert et al., 2008). African American and 
Hispanic populations are less likely to have health insurance resulting in poorer health 
with some of the highest incidence rates of cancer, diabetes, and heart disease (Russell, 
2010). Each of these extraneous variables contributed to the internal validity of the study.  
Two core features of the correlational, cross-sectional design are: (a) the ability to 
allow researchers to perform the study in a real-world setting or in its natural 
environment, thereby increasing external validity and (b) sampling does not require 
random assignment (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). A cross-sectional design allows 
for flexibility in selecting a sample that is most applicable and generalizable to the 
research questions. The quasi-experimental design closely aligns with the goals of the 
experiment, but the cross-sectional design uses a statistical data analysis to determine the 





The internal validity of the study is susceptible to the weaknesses of the cross-
sectional design. Cross-sectional designs are challenged with weak control but are 
balanced with strong representation, allowing the researcher to make statistical inferences 
to a larger population expanding the ability to generalize findings (Frankfort-Nachmias et 
al., 2015). This design type creates operational boundaries in its inability to manipulate 
the incentive size; I hypothesized it to be a predictor of ACO MSSP performance in this 
study (see Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008).  
I centralized the research questions in this study around collecting data extracted 
from a natural environment that could be used to measure any existing variable 
relationships (see Creswell, 2015; Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). The performance 
outcomes I investigated in this study included the frequency of acute care readmissions 
and the occurrence of ED visits not resulting in admissions, variables which could reflect 
that care or its quality was unreliable in the delivery of services and treatment. The use of 
hospital-related services under fee-for-services may be substantially higher than an APM 
of care aligned with an efficient and comprehensive ACO provider care, which motivates 
the choice of the final dependent variable: total expenditures of MSSP contracted 
Medicare beneficiaries. 
If I found a relationship between variables in this cross-sectional study, causation 
would not be implied. Statistical data analysis additionally informs the researcher of a 
positive or inverse correlation between variables (Creswell, 2015). In the correlation of 
variables, positive correlation occurs when the rise of one variable prompts a rise in 




when the rise in one variable results in the drop of another or reversed variable (Field, 
2013).  
The purpose of the control variables is to manage the external influence from 
confounding or extraneous factors and to help identify outliers that may skew the 
statistical data analysis (Creswell, 2015). I used seven control variables in this study. By 
controlling for these potentially confounding factors in the research, a researcher reduces 
the risk of inaccurately attributing the association between the independent and 
dependent variables to these factors, thereby improving statistical validity of the models 
(Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). Multivariable-adjusted regression statistical models 
are able to minimize confounding if the relevant confounding factors were measured 
during data collection (Pourhoseingholi, Baghestano, & Vahedi, 2012). 
Methodology 
The target population of this study was ACOs participating in the MSSP, and the 
unit of analysis was the ACO. Participating ACOs serve no less than 5,000 beneficiaries 
as per the criteria of the program (CMS, 2016). This population can be defined as 
individuals 65 years and older who are temporarily or permanently disabled and those 
with kidney failure (ESRD). These recipients are assigned to an ACO contracted by CMS 
to meet their health care needs. In the 2015 MSSP, ACO performances were captured for 
348 ACOs actively participating in the CMS’s APM initiative under Tracks 1 and 2. Each 
ACO serves thousands of Medicare beneficiaries (CMS, 2016). These ACOs are 




payment options inclusive in the use of financial incentives (CMS, 2016). The aim of this 
study was to determine the MSSP incentive value. 
Sample Size and Power Analysis 
The unit of analysis in this study was ACOs contracted under the MSSP to serve 
the Medicare population. I used secondary data for the independent and dependent 
variables in the ACO dataset. CMS data include quality-focused performance measures 
linked to performance standards of ACOs contracted to meet or exceed defined 
benchmark goals. Data are systematically collected and analyzed, with annual updates 
producing associated risk scores impacting ACO financial rewards and balancing validity 
and quality of care with consideration of the fluctuating levels of individual health risks 
(see Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). In this nonexperimental study of ACOs 
contracted with the CMS to deliver quality health care nationally, the sampling unit was a 
single ACO. I refined the focus of the sampling frame to specifically include MSSP 
participating ACOs.  
Power is influenced by three factors in research: the effect size, the alpha level, 
and sample size (Burkholder, n.d.; Field, 2013). The alpha level should be kept small to 
avoid Type I error; this error occurs when the null hypothesis is true but rejected, 
showing significant effects of the independent variable (in this study, incentive size), 
when none exists (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). The larger the alpha value, the 
greater the region of probability is to reject the null hypothesis (Burkholder, n.d.). Setting 
the alpha level at 95% translates to only a 5% chance for a Type I error of inaccurately 




probability of a Type II error occurring in the research (Burkholder, n.d). The power is 
the ability of the statistical test to identify a relationship, indicating 80% of the time the 
null hypothesis will be rejected (Field, 2013). 
I performed a G*Power calculation based on the defined input parameters 
described using eight covariates. Under the F test family, the linear multiple regression: 
fixed model, R
2 
deviation from zero statistical test is selected using an a priori analysis to 
determine adequate sample size at 80% power (see Field, 2013). Given that this study 
included three dependent variables, a Bonferroni’s correction was applied. A Bonferroni 
correction is applied to the alpha (α) as a strategy to control for Type I errors in the 
multiple regression tests of a study (Field, 2013). In the correction, alpha is divided by 
three (α/3), correcting the error of probability to .0167 in the calculation (see Field, 
2013).  
An a priori power calculation was performed using G*Power (2017) based on a 
Bonferroni-correct alpha of .017, a medium effect size (f 
2
) of .15, a power selection of 
.80 for an eight independent variable regression model. The power calculation resulted in 
a minimum sample size requirement of 136. Given the 348 participating ACOs and these 
parameters, the study will have sufficient power. The sample of this study is set at N = 
348, surpassing the minimum required sample size to achieve the desired power of the 
predictive relationship.  
Archival Data  
My study used archival or secondary data. The CMS 2015 MSSP ACO public use 




identifying and outlining all study selected variables. Data collection procedures included 
accessing the 2015 SSP ACO PUF via the CMS website, then downloading the 2015 
database file in Excel and the companion code book of variable definitions used in the 
database. There are no required permissions necessary to access this public data. The 
MSSP is a public program provided to Medicare recipients. It is developed and 
implemented by CMS, which uses accountable improvement strategies to align quality, 
cost, and access to care for this segment of the population. The SSP ACO Excel PUF 
dataset is a standard analytical file of ACO-specific measures, with recipient and provider 
content per performance year of the program (CMS, 2016).  
Each contracted ACO provides data to the CMS that is merged into one complete 
dataset of metrics of quality and performance. Data collected are organized and used to 
calculate quality. They are also used to determine if quality benchmarks are met, 
initiating a possible bonus or penalty to the ACO or directly to the provider. The data 
provided in the PUF are unobtrusive of the patient’s privacy. Values are collected with 
minimal bias and without identifiable patient information impeding the study. There are 
no identifiable characteristics of the ACOs or their recipients in the reported information 
from the CMS database that would lead to bias in data collection. Bias can occur at 
several stages of research, bias in data collection and analysis in this study surfaces 
potential concerns with obstacles in the study’s validity. Potential performance bias exists 
in the diversity of provider behavior when delivering care according to the CMS quality 





Incentive size. The CMS SSP ACO PUF includes the total benchmark 
expenditures  (TBE) variable and is a proxy for incentive size in this study. TBE are the 
total dollar amount spent per person per year or ACO health care expenses calculated 
using a risk-adjustment model per beneficiary (CMS, 2016). This continuous variable is 
defined on an interval numbering scale; the variable provides a monetary scale of 
measure based on absolute zero (Field, 2013). This variable identifies the difference in 
money saved given the opportunity to earn greater bonuses that align ACO performance 
with incentive size, incentive size being the independent/predictor variable of this study. 
ACO performance. Acute care readmissions are identified as the variable labeled 
readm_Rate_1000; this continuous variable represents the total number of acute care 
readmissions (all-cause-30 day) per 1,000 discharges of the ACO population (CMS, 
2016). Disease severity can contribute to the rate of readmissions. The greater number of 
chronic conditions or a poorer health status of a participant can increase the usage of a 
resource, this includes expenditures related to readmissions and ED visits (Colla et al., 
2016). Performance of an ACO can be interpreted in many ways, in the scope of this 
study the readmission rates represent additional expenses for this population, and thus 
controlling for these adversely severe conditions can provide control over their individual 
influence on health outcome statistics of an ACO (Colla et al., 2016; Nyweide et al., 
2015).  
Outpatient emergency department visits per 1,000 beneficiaries can be measured 




frequency of the ED use without admission (CMS, 2016). Given the team-based approach 
to comprehensive care in this setting, implications of this are expenses generated from 
these visits, where readmissions and ED visits are preventable in nature provided the care 
being delivered by the ACO is responsive, coordinated, and directly linked to ACO 
performance (Colla et al., 2016; Nyweide et al., 2015). The final dependent variable is 
the per capita expenditures of the ACO Medicare population. This variable was initially 
coded as ABtotExp in the dataset and is measured as the per member expenditures 
weighted by the assigned recipient proportions for all Medicare enrollment types in the 
performance period in a given ACO (CMS, 2016).  
The original variable identified to represent per capita spending was measuring 
the same data as incentive size according to initial statistical findings, therefore the 
variable shifted from “total performance year spending per assigned beneficiary” or 
ABtotEXP to “total expenditures per assigned AGED/NON-DUAL beneficiary” or 
Per_Capita_Exp_ALL_AGND. This variable is deemed continuous in nature (Field, 
2013).  
Control (potential confounding) variables. Control variables are introduced to 
adjust for confounding factors. The control variables include the number of Medicare 
beneficiaries age 85 years old or older (N_Ben_Age_85plus), African Americans 
(N_Ben_Race_Black) and Hispanics (N_Ben_Race_Hisp), ACO size (N_AB), males 
(N_BEN_Male), the disabled (N_AB_Year_DIS) and ACO hospital affiliation status. 
The number of those aged 85+, the number of African Americans and Hispanics in 




contracted to deliver care via the ACO setting are captured. The number of recipients 
aged 85 years old and older as of January 1, 2013, were included in the dataset. These 
individuals identified present a possible threat to variable consistency; those at this age 
are mostly likely to be chronically ill demanding costly services making their per capita 
account of health-related expenditures higher (CMS, 2015). All control variables are 
continuous data (CMS, 2015). The number of participants identified as African American 
(i.e., race = 2) and Hispanic (i.e., race = 5) is captured in the CMS PUF dataset (CMS, 
2015). Traditionally, these races have less access to health care based on socio-economic 
factors, such as income and education level (Lee, 2015). These patients absorb more 
health resources, as their lack of preventative care and prolonged access to treatment 
leads to greater resource usage and higher expenditures. These races were controlled for 
as they can extraneously influence outcome measures given their level of disease severity 
as a result of health disparities these races face prior to age 65. Disease severity is 
represented by a combination of control variables including age (85 +), race (Hispanics & 
African Americans), gender (Male), and disability status. These variables assist in 
controlling for confounding effects in the study of diverse disease severity of the studied 
population. 
The sicker patients consume more resources such as the hospital’s emergency 
department and increases hospital readmissions, hence the need to control for these 
expenses that present as outside the norm. The “total number of assigned beneficiaries 
per performance year” is recognized as N_AB in the codebook and is defined as a 




ACO, controlling for diversity in size among ACOs participating in the MSSP (CMS, 
2015). Disease severity also contributes significantly to expenditures; this requires 
control of additional confounding factors and potential influence of Medicare’s clinically 
vulnerable subpopulation with proxies assigned to gender (N_BEN_Male) and those with 
disabilities (N_AB_Year_DIS) (CMS, 2015). Health outcomes can be confounded by 
both gender and disabilities, responsible for increased provider attention and a greater 
proportion of expenses. Gender is identified as a categorical (binary) covariate in this 
socialized category of Medicare; this variable represents the total number of male 
beneficiaries in 2015 enrolled in the MSSP (CMS, 2105). The National Institute of 
Health defines the clinically vulnerable as aged and disabled, with the disabled plagued 
with multiple chronic conditions; this study merges these variables as representatives of 
disease severity (Colla et al., 2016).  
Hospital affiliation is represented in the dataset by the combined number of 
N_CAH and N_ETA hospitals included in the dataset (CMS, 2016). These two types of 
hospitals are contracted with local ACOs to provide coordinated care in response to acute  
readmissions, The N_CAH variable includes all Level II critical access facilities and 
N_ETA captures all elected teaching hospitals contracted with an ACO to assist in 
delivering preventative and comprehensive services in outpatient setting with modifying 
attribution of beneficiaries (CMS, 2016). The ED frequency of ACO beneficiaries 
included in the MSSP and is one of three dependent variables studied. Readmission and 




and its potential influence on the outcome of the study, with economically- or 
competitively-influenced decision-making.  
Table 1 
Variables by Type and Scale 
Continuous Variable Types  
Predictor  Variable –IV  
Incentive Size (dollar amount) 
Response Variables –DVs  
Acute Readmissions 
ED visits 
Per Capita Expenditures 
Continuous Control Variables                                                                      
Risk Adjustment Controls 
Number of ACO beneficiaries age 85+                                             
Number of ACO beneficiaries of Hispanic ethnicity                        
Number of ACO beneficiaries of African American ethnicity         
Number of Male ACO beneficiaries                                                 
Number of Disabled ACO beneficiaries        
Categorical Control Variables                                    
Operational Structure Controls                                                         
Hospital Affiliation                                                                           
ACO Size (number of ACO beneficiaries)                                       
  Group 1 = 0 – 8,500 
  Group 2 = 8,501 – 22,500 
  Group 3 = 22,501 + 
 
After reevaluation of the MSSP PUF data set variables selected changes occurred. 
An alternative per capita spending variable was selected that would be a more conducive 
match for the variable being tested. Assumptions were violated, heteroscedasticity, and 
non-linearity occurred for all dependent variables, thus a transformation was performed 




calculation and the covariates measuring the number of Hispanics, African Americans, 
Disabled, aged 85+, and males were converted to percentages to normalize relation to 
100 given the larger database size. Compared to log, inverse, or square root 
transformations, Box-Cox transforms residual data by searching for the most appropriate 
lambda (-5 to 5) value to best approximately normalize data and improve validity 
(Osborne, 2010). Additionally, ACO size category perspective was altered to improve 
multicollinearity. The ACO size was organized into three groups based on the number of 
assigned beneficiaries; ACOs were assigned as falling into one of three size categories; 
small (Group 1 = 0 – 8,500), medium (Group 2 = 8,501 – 22,500) and large (Group 3 = 
22,501 +). These changes assist in meeting the regression assumptions.  
Data Analysis Plan 
The collection of data is used to craft a more accurate and minimally biased 
statistical analysis to test the multiple hypotheses. IBM SPSS Version 23 statistical 
software was used to analyze the study’s predictor (independent [IV]), criterion 
(dependent [DV]) and control variables. Multiple statistical analyses were completed 
between the incentive size (IV) and acute readmission rates, outpatient ED visits and per 
capita expenditures (DVs) of the ACO MSSP population to determine if a relationship is 
present.  
Sample Population Description and Representation 
A total of 348 ACOs contracted under the MSSP defines the sample tested in the 
research presented. The entire ACO PUF included three alternative payment strategies 




omission of the advanced payment model from the sample. Each of the sampled ACOs 
includes a range of assigned Medicare beneficiaries within the 10 national regions, which 
are defined by CMS (CMS, 2017). Medicare beneficiaries are defined as either aged 65 
or older, disabled, or having end stage renal disease (ESRD; CMS, 2017). These regional 
ACOs serve a population size ranging from 147,852 (among nine ACOs in Region 10) to 
1.7 million (among 135 ACOs in Region 4) actively participating beneficiaries (CMS, 
2017). Beneficiaries of the MSSP participating population are statistically represented in 
the sample in terms of socioeconomic diversities and the effects of disease severity on 
health outcomes of specific population groups. As the gap between health status 
disparities begin to narrow at age 65, chronic conditions begin to increase and 
characteristics of these disparities shift an individual’s health status. The sample tested 
and analyzed contains a variety of health statuses respective of the population, supporting 
research controlling for confounding socioeconomic factors related to racial disparities, 
disease severity, age (85+), and ACO population diversity.  
The dataset was cleaned and screened for potential data outliers of the study by 
using a scatter plot. ACOs participating in the advanced payment model payment reform 
program were omitted from the sample as this program offers different incentive modes 
and strategies. Advanced payment models work on the basis of a different motivational 
concept. Raw data is reduced to the conformed version of the utilized data set, extracting 
the data identified as the independent and dependent variables. Multiple linear regression 
was applied in the analysis of data. 





Research Question 1: How does the MSSP value-based incentive size relate to the 
ACOs’ performance on acute care readmission rates?  
Research Question 2:  How does the MSSP value-based incentive size relate to 
the ACOs’ performance on the frequency of ED visits that do not result in a hospital 
admission? 
Research Question 3:  What is the association between the MSSP value-based 
incentive size and the performance year spending per ACO Medicare beneficiaries? 
Hypotheses.  
 H01:  There is no statistical relationship between the incentive size of the MSSP 
and acute care readmission rates in an ACO setting. 
 H11:  There is a statistical relationship between the incentive size of the MSSP 
and acute care readmission rates in an ACO setting. 
H02:  There is no statistical relationship between the incentive size of the MSSP 
and ED visits in an ACO setting. 
H12: There is a statistical relationship between the incentive size of the MSSP and 
ED visits in an ACO setting. 
H03: There is no statistical relationship between the incentive size of the MSSP 
and per capita expenditures in an ACO setting. 
H13:  There is a statistical relationship between the incentive size of the MSSP 




Descriptive statistics provide quantifiable outcomes from which to describe and 
interpret collected data (Trochin, 2006). This study is defined as cross-sectional with one 
predictor, three criterions, and seven control variables. Parametric statistics are applied to 
data assuming there is normal distribution. Assuming values are normally distributed; 
supplementary information is captured through parametric statistics of the mean and the 
standard deviation (Simpson, 2015). The mean is the mathematic average of the values 
per variable and standard deviation shows the dispersion of the values surrounding the 
mean, this is seen in a scatter plot (Simpson, 2015). 
For linear regression, it is assumed that the predictor and outcome variables are 
normally distributed in the population; the second assumption is that a random sample 
was generated where variable scores are independent of other scores (Salkind & Green, 
2014). The Durbin-Watson statistic evaluates the assumptions of the regression model. 
Serial correlations between errors can be tested for with the Durbin-Watson test to 
determine if independence is violated, this value should be between 1.5 and 2.5 (Field, 
2015).  
A scatter plot was created for each DV allowing for visualization of the mean and 
standard deviation of the values report. Scatter plots for each DV generated showed 
multivariate categories in relation to all variables, providing structure to the analysis of 
correlation coefficients. Initially the ACO MSSP data presented a nonnormal distribution 
of all DV values, thus a transformation calculation was performed converting data into a 
normal distribution. When there are extreme outliers and when the nature of the variables 




may have led to computation inaccuracies. Secondly, normality can be accomplished by 
applying a power transformation test to the data thus raising data to an exponential 
power.  
This study utilized a Box-Cox transformation to convert data in the event of a 
non-normal distribution (Osborne, 2010). The Box-Cox transformation improved 
normality by adjusting data, while also correcting for nonlinearity and heteroscedasicity 
(Osborne, 2010). A normal probability plot was performed after Box-Cox transformation 
of standard residuals for all DVs, which verified that the assumption of normality was 
met, further controlling for residual errors.  
The Box-Cox transformation formula is;  
 (Osborne, 2010) 
A scatter plot showed a linear relationship in the form of a line applying a single 
predictor or plane with several predictors as in the study’s multiple regression tests post 
transformation (Field, 2013). The relationship of variables is shown in the scatter plot 
indicating the incentive size’s predictability for each DV among correlating variables. 
Additionally, an SPSS generated scatter plot provided for the three multiple linear 
regression tests inclusive of the DVs, IV, and the control variables (covariates). Residuals 
identified in the produced scatter plot showed unequal variances, outliers, and 
nonlinearity (Field, 2013).  
Additionally, remaining assumptions were tested on transformed data. 




that the predictor residuals have similar variances; violation of this assumption 
invalidates the confidence intervals and t-test (Field, 2013). Collinearity diagnostics were 
run producing variance inflation factors per DV and outliers were identified using Cook’s 
distance showing the influence of a predictor variable on the DV (Field, 2013). 
Heteroscedasticity was evaluated on transformed data after the removal of identified 
outliers with the White’s test per each DV (Field, 2013). 
The hypotheses were tested by running a set of multiple linear regression models 
to determine if a relationship exists between incentive size (predictor) and acute care 
readmission rates, the frequency of outpatient ED visits and per capita expenditures 
(criterions) of ACO beneficiaries. The multiple linear regression tests adjusted for 
confounding factors by using control variables. Controlled variables are intertwined in 
the statistical data to control them from influencing outcomes.  
For each research question, regression tests were performed, a set of three 
multiple regression tests were conducted. These multiple linear regressions were 
conducted to estimate the relationship between incentive size and each dependent 
variable, including the controlled variables (i.e., multivariable-adjusted models). 
Multiple regression analyses were executed for each of the three dependent 
variables and the single independent variable with the inclusion of control variables. The 
multiple regression model equations for this presented study are formulated and adapted 
below. 
ŶDV = b0 + bIVX1 + b2 control variable 2+ b3 control variable 3+ b4 control variable 4+ b5 control variable5 




Per capita expenditures = b0+ b1 incentive size 1+ b2 African Americans 2+ b3 Hispanic 3+ b4 aged 
85 4+ b5 Hospital Affiliation5 + b6 ACO size 6 + b7 Males 7 + b8 Disabled 8 + Ԑi 
ED visits = b0+ b1 incentive size + b2 African Americans 2+ b3 Hispanic 3+ b4 aged 85 4+ b5 Hospital 
Affiliation5 + b6 ACO size 6 + b7 Males 7 + b8 Disabled 8 + Ԑi  
Acute readmissions = b0+ b1 incentive size + b2 African Americans 2+ b3 Hispanic 3+ b4 aged 85 4+ 
b5 Hospital Affiliation5 + b6 ACO size 6 + b7 Males 7 + b8 Disabled 8 + Ԑi 
Ԑ = random error 
b0 = y intercept 
Ŷ = dependent variables (criterion) 
b1 = independent variable (predictor) 
b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, b8 = control variables (covariates) 
The statistical analysis of the dependent variables, acute readmission rates, ED 
visit rates and per capita spending, provided insight on how, and at what level, financial 
incentives influence the utilization of health resources, directly related to spending and 
quality of ACO performance. A predictive relationship was tested on the reformed 
incentive payment value (size) with behavioral correlations of the provider treatment 
decision-making. Per capita spending and resource expenditures were based on health 
care usage and are additionally expected to change incentive value (Lee, 2014).  
The SPSS multiple linear regression model analysis yielded statistical data 
outcomes used to analyze predictive correlation outcomes include a summary of data, 
coefficients, with an ANOVA, a comprehensive model summary, descriptive statistics 




the multiple regression test calculations to determine assumption criteria and normality is 
met. Various statistical values were produced.  
ANOVA tables were produced for the multivariable linear regression. As a result 
of the regression test performed, SPSS produced a model summary including R
2
 
designating the level of variance in the model, yielding the portion of the outcome 
variables shared by the predictor variable. The model fit is represented by the R
2 
value; 
the value provides a quantitative account of variation in the mean number of acute 
readmissions, ED visits and per capita expenditures predicted by the MSSPs incentive 
size in the performed regression tests (Field, 2013). In the multiple regression tests, 
significance (p) is set at 0.05; this value shows the change in F. The F-ratio determines 
the model’s ability to predict the outcome. If the F-ratio value is less than 0.05, findings 
would be significant, thus concluding that the regression model significantly predicts 
acute readmission rates, ED visits, and per capita expenditures of MSSP ACOs. If 
findings indicate a significant relationship the null hypothesis is rejected. The p value or 
alpha (< 0.05) measures statistically significant relationships and the probability of 
measuring support against the null hypothesis, smaller p values will indicate stronger 
evidence (Field, 2013).  
Coefficient output produced by the multiple regression tests provided information 
on the direction (positive or negative) and strength (Pearson Correlation r) to assist in 
defining the relationship between variables, should one exist (Green & Salkind, 2014). 
The regression coefficient b signifies a change in the response variable based on a unit 




outcome/s (Field, 2013). If statistical significance is present, this implies that the b value 
should be different from zero (b ≠ 0; Field, 2013). A 95% confidence interval was 
determined for each DV post transformation, after all assumptions were met.  
The independence of observations was determined through the Durbin-Watson 
value in this model summary as an assumption of regression. The multiple linear 
regression model was a good fit to measure the covariate’s ability to predict the number 
of acute readmissions, ED visits and per capita spending of MSSP ACOs. The covariates 
to be tested include the incentive size, and all control variables; aged 85+, ACO size, 
African Americans, Hispanics, males, disabled beneficiaries and hospitals contracted 
with ACOs to provide care under the MSSP. A scatter plot was performed with one 
predictor and seven covariates for each DV, to determine if a linear relationship is present 
with control of confounding variables. For the multiple regression models, descriptive 
statistics were produced, inclusive of all covariates to measure the mean per DV and the 
predictability of incentive size on acute readmissions, ED visits, and per capita 
expenditures.  
In the multiple linear regression models, the ANOVA output includes the F ratio. 
The F-test determines if the IV predicts the dependent variable when controlling for 
cofounding variables with an alpha of 0.05 in SPSS calculations. The F-test evaluates the 
null hypothesis, determining if the coefficients are greater than 1 indicating the 
probability of the outcome occurring due to chance with supporting significance (Field, 
2013). This statistic informs the researcher if the null hypothesis is rejected or not 




intersection of the vertical axis (intercept point) on the graph generating the regression 
coefficient linearly (Field, 2013).  
Threats to Validity 
The correlational design applied to this research poses both advantages and 
disadvantages of validity. Data retrieved from an archival resource, with general public 
access, empirical evidence supports the choices of measures, and measured benchmarks 
are directly linked to tasks controllable by the physician or the ACO team from which to 
determine if quality is met. These defined and measured benchmarks indicate if specific 
goals have been met in the SSP ACO PUF dataset collected by CMS. While no design is 
infallible, there are strategies that can be taken to avoid threats to a study’s validity. This 
study did not apply a sample strategy since secondary data was used. The measurement 
instrument used in the statistical analysis of study’s variables is the CMS quality 
performance standards 33 point nationally recognized quality of measure instrument 
reporting year end data. The 33 quality measures are a culmination of CMS claims, 
administrative, CMS web interface including a survey of patient satisfaction data reported 
annually (RTI, 2015). 
Measurement error refers to the variability in deducting the quality specific 
measures and ensuring that these measures take on meaningful outcomes of provider 
performance practices in these ACOs. Meaningful use measures have been developed by 
CMS that best indicate quality of care with newly reformed payment strategies 
supporting these actions and these benchmarks are universally utilized by all contracted 




with indirect use of an instrument by CMS (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). 
Measurement error occurs when score variances are due to anything besides factual 
differences (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). Temporary changes in political conditions 
could also influence measurement perception or behavior, creating measurement errors. 
Recent policy changes have the potential to produce disincentives of the newly reformed 
alternative payment models (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015).  
Due to the inability of correlational designs to show causality, the internal validity 
of the design is weak. The introduction of control variables protect against findings being 
attributed to alternative hypotheses; in this aspect, the correlation design is effective. This 
study utilizes control variables to improve the internal validity of the study’s design. The 
control of these variables contributes to the study’s internal validity, so that the outcome 
cannot be attributed to them as the design is threatened by weak control over extrinsic 
and intrinsic influences. Causal inferences can be made alternatively when no link to 
causality if present, but statistical techniques can improve the quality of those inferences 
in the correlational design (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). Using control variables in 
this research helps to strengthen control in the natural setting of the study and generalize 
the findings to realistic situations. External validity revolves around the ability of the 
sample to represent the focused population and when the sampled setting is not reflective 
of the natural setting. External validity is strong, as the sample is inclusive of all 
participating ACOs in the MSSP.  
Mild concerns of statistical validity of the variables are present; threats to validity 




assumption violation of the statistical test performed (Trochim, 2006). A strong statistical 
power improves conclusion validity; this study uses 80% power and can also be 
influenced by a larger sample size (Trochim, 2006).  
There is potential for omitted-variable bias in the study. If a significantly 
confounding factor is omitted from the study, the under or over compensation will occur 
in response to the missing variable (Berkeley Department of Agricultural & Resource 
Economics, 2015). Omitted-variable bias occurs when a key variable is not included in 
the regression model performed but correlates with both the independent and dependent 
variables biasing β (Berkeley Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, 2015). 
Examples of omitted variables in this study with the potential to impact the outcomes 
include the extent of ACO operations management of coordinated care and in incentive 
design. Each ACO has the autonomy to structure the operational delivery of care to 
ensure quality; the incentive models provided through federal programs do not define 
operations of the ACO nor the incentive structure itself (CMS, 2015). The incentive 
could be absorbed by the ACO or it can be distributed among the clinical team that 
produced improved readmission rates, reduced ED visits and reduced per capita spending 
by delivering cost effective treatment and service options. The structure of the ACO 
operations and the structure of the ACO incentive could have potential influence on the 
study’s outcome and are not included in the variables tested. 
Ethical Procedures 
The measures taken for protection of participants’ rights were maintained by the 




from these reports before submission to the CMS dataset. There was no direct contact 
with Medicare participants or ACO administration form in regard to the data that will be 
used in this study. There are no formal agreements needed to obtain this archival data 
from the public access file via the CMS website. There is complete participant anonymity 
in the dataset. While ACOs are named with addresses, there is no need to contact these 
organizations for study purposes, as the contract between them and CMS allows this data 
to be accessed without bias. No informed consent was requested, as data is secondary.  
Prior to working with the CMS dataset, the institutional review board approval 
number 12-06-17-0557409 was obtained from Walden University. No informed consent 
was required with use of secondary data of unprotected health information, as the 
database is archival and Medicare recipient data cannot be linked individually. 
CMS Archival Database  
Secondary data were the single source contributing to the research. The CMS SSP 
ACO public access file is obtained via the agency’s website, through a downloadable zip 
file. Data utilized in this study will be generated from the 2015 performance year and 
saved in a Microsoft Excel format (CMS, 2016). This data and research findings will be 
retained on a secured hard drive. All of the data used in this research will be kept in a 
password-protected file on a password-protected computer. Once the research is 
concluded, the data will be destroyed by deleting it from the computer. 
Some ethical concerns of the study include competition of private and public 
insurance organizations or programs. Accountable care organizations may treat privately 




motivated. As this study has no interventions or treatment data collection tasks that 
engage any outside individual or organization, there is no foreseeable conflicts of interest 
impacting the research.  
Summary  
In this chapter, I provided the research design and methodology for the study of 
secondary data obtained by CMS. The correlational design of the study guides the 
analysis of ACO alternative payment model’s financial incentive size by testing for a 
correlation between the predictor and the three outcome variables (acute care 
readmissions, per capita expenditures and outpatient ED visits) of concentrated segment 
of the population of interest at a single point in time. The three multivariate regression 
test findings will determine if financial incentives size predicts acute care readmission 
rates, per capita expenses of the ACO participating beneficiaries and/or outpatient ED 
visits. Control variables were introduced in regression tests, consisting of several 
potential outliers; those aged 85 years old and older, Hispanic and African Americans, 
ACO size, males, disabled beneficiaries and hospital affiliation. This study targeted a 
vulnerable population with significant health challenges. The 65 and older age group 
represents a substantial portion of consumers accessing health service. Nearly 60 million 
of these individuals receive health care through a federal regulated MSSP program, such 
as the one tested in this study (Social Security Administration, 2016).  
This study design determined correlations made between the IV and the DVs, 
through the use of quantitative statistical data analysis of archival data, designed and 




of APM financial incentives that intend to promote quality care in an ACO defined 
setting. The predictive relationship of the incentive size is perceived to be the predictor of 
ACO performance according to this dissertation. The VBPIT framework presents a 
streamlined data analysis process to test the hypotheses without violating the study’s 
integrity, ethics or compromising participate data, thus validating the study’s findings 
with statistical support. Descriptive statistics using mean, standard deviation, and 
frequency were compiled and reported, as well. Chapter Four provides a complete report 
of the results found in this chapter. The report also includes descriptive statistics and 
statistical assumptions where appropriate. Accompanying tables and figures illustrating 





Chapter 4: ACO Performance Results 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to examine the predictive relationship between 
financial incentive sizes used in the ACO MSSP and their alignment with ACO 
performance linked to provider decision-making behavior. I developed the research 
questions to determine whether such a relationship exists between the financial incentive 
size and the three dependent variables: ACO readmission rates, ED visits not resulting in 
a hospital admission, and per capita expenses of the Medicare subpopulation participating 
in the shared savings program. The MSSP uses a defined metric standard of incentive 
amounts and quality specified measures applied to the ACO’s reimbursement 
methodology (CMS, 2017a). I also used the quality performance predictors linked to 33 
quality benchmark metrics identified by CMS (2017a) in this study. My use of the 
VBPIT as the theoretical framework supported the SPSS statistical data outputs presented 
within the scope of behavioral economics. Theoretically, molding contractual 
arrangement contributions in an effort to balance provider motivation and medical 
decision-making optimizes performance and quality delivered care (Conrad, 2015). 
Political and regulatory implications support a more efficient, higher quality, and 
responsive health care delivery system, further supporting the application of universal 
quality standards by using defaults in the delivery of clinically-coordinated care. 
I developed the following research questions and hypotheses to support the 




Research Question 1: How does the MSSP value-based incentive size relate to the 
ACOs’ performance on acute care readmission rates?  
H01: There is no statistical relationship between the incentive size of the 
MSSP and acute care readmission rates in an ACO setting. 
H11: There is a statistical relationship between the incentive size of the 
MSSP and acute care readmission rates in an ACO setting. 
 Research Question 2: How does the MSSP value-based incentive size relate to 
the ACOs’ performance on the frequency of ED visits that do not result in a 
hospital admission? 
H02: There is no statistical relationship between the incentive size of the 
MSSP and ED visits in an ACO setting. 
H12: There is a statistical relationship between the incentive size of the 
MSSP and ED visits in an ACO setting. 
Research Question 3: What is the association between the MSSP value-based 
incentive size and the total performance year spending per ACO Medicare 
beneficiaries? 
H03: There is no statistical relationship between the incentive size of the 
MSSP and per capita expenditures in an ACO setting. 
H13: There is a statistical relationship between the incentive size of the 
MSSP and per capita expenditures in an ACO setting. 
 In Chapter 4, I will present the statistical findings of this study. Sampling 




CMS (2016). I used publicly available secondary data to test for relationships between 
the variables. Scatter plots using CMS MSSP PUF specific database variables were used 
to evaluate the statistical assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity for each 
dependent variable in this study; therefore,  I will present results for the three multiple 
regression tests. The statistical analyses that will be presented in this chapter include a 
narrative and visual presentation of the assumptions of multiple linear regression, Box-
Cox transformation statistic, descriptive statistics, model alignment, and t-test 
significance. I used SPSS to perform the analyses and the statistical outputs of the three 
multiple regression tests. The actual steps in data collection did not vary from the steps 
that I outlined in Chapter 3. 
Results 
Descriptive Analyses 
Descriptive statistics should be provided for all variables in the study, providing 
an analysis of the measures of the variability and central tendency of the variables (Field, 
2013). Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the independent variable (incentive 
size), the three dependent variables (acute care readmissions, outpatient ED visits, and 
per capita expenditures of aged beneficiaries), and eight additional covariates that are 





Table 2   
Sample Characteristics: Variable Specific Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
Study variables Minimum Maximum M SD 
Dependent variables         
  Number of acute care 
readmissions  
  (all-cause 30 days) 93 268 169.07 25.46 
  Number of outpatient ED 
visits 316 1461 728.24 167.26 
  Per capita expenditures of  




      Incentive size  ($) 3,782,336 1,704,960,610  198,919,076 192,394,993 
Covariates         
  ACO size (Gp 1 = 1 – 
8,500; Gp 2 = 8,501 – 
22,500; Gp 3 = 22,501 +)   513 149,633 19854.55 19224.173 
  Number of disabled 
beneficiaries  45 21966 2,645.31 2591.96 
  Number of assigned 
beneficiaries aged 85+ 44 19734 2,489.58 2519.13 
  Number of assigned male 
beneficiaries 295 62716 8,489.05 8236.57 
  Number of assigned African 
American  
  beneficiaries  3 18048 1,677.00 2145.4 
  Number of assigned 
Hispanic beneficiaries 1 3078 285.65 443.62 
  Number of critical access  
  hospitals 0 52 0.83 3.65 
  Number of electing teaching  
  amendment hospitals 0 8 0.03 0.43 
Note. N = 348. 
 






Prior to running multiple regression tests, I investigated five assumptions against 
the set of variables listed in Table 1. The assumptions of normality, linearity, 
homoscedasticity, multicollinearity, and a review of the multivariate outliers were 
assessed for each DV used in the multiple regression tests performed.  Variables include 
three DVs, one IV, and eight covariates.  
I used scatter plots to test the linearity of the sampling distribution of the DV 
while controlling for the confounding variables included in the regressions. Scatter plots 
also allowed for the visual identification of outliers. Additionally, Cook’s distance or 
Cook’s D was completed for a statistical confirmation of bivariate outliers for each DV. 
By examining the standardized and predicted residual values, homoscedasticity was 
assessed (see Williams, 2015). In this study, I tested the assumption of homoscedasticity 
using scatter plots showing visually skewed data and then with White’s test 
posttransformation. The assumption of multicollinearity was tested by producing a 
collinearity diagnostic for the variance inflation factor (VIF) of each variable. These 
values identify the relative strength between two or more predictor/explanatory variables 
(see Field, 2018). The number of beneficiaries that are disabled, aged 85 years or older, 
males, African American, and Hispanic were transformed to percentages, and these 
values were each divided by the ACO size and then multiplied by 100. Normality was 
also assumed and the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality, a multiple regression test, was run 
in SPSS (see Field, 2018). To assess normality, I inspected the datasets were visually 




of errors assumption was tested by running a Durbin-Watson calculation, which can 
detect serial correlations between residuals (see Field, 2013). The Durbin-Watson 
statistic-value informs the researcher if the assumption of independence has been violated 
(Field, 2015). Nonviolations of these assumptions further contribute to the confidence 
and generalizability of the findings. Prior to data analysis, the minimum sample size was 
calculated by applying alpha to a medium effect size at 80% power using SPSS. I then 
used a Bonferroni’s corrected alpha (.017), which resulted in a calculated sample size of 
136 ACOs.  
Research Question 1: Incentive Size and Acute Care Readmissions 
I determined the assumption of independence by the Durbin-Watson value 
calculated for Research Question1, yielding a 1.899 value. This value indicated that there 
was no violation of independence of the acute care readmission variable dataset. The 
scatter plot of the explanatory variable of Research Question 1 is presented in Figure 1 
because heteroscedasticity and nonlinear in its presentation of the acute readmissions rate 
dataset correlated with its unstandardized predicted values. To further evaluate the 
assumption of homoscedasticity in this dataset, I performed White’s test yielding 
additional support to reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity as p = .004. There is a 
0.45% chance of rejecting a true null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. Thus, the 
assumption has been violated and the alternative hypothesis of heteroscedasticity was not 
rejected. Based on scatter plots that were run with initial data, the assumption of linearity 
was additionally violated. In response to violations of linearity and homoscedasticity, I 




Multicollinearity and VIF 
Multicollinearity occurs when an explanatory or independent variable is strongly 
related to a linear combination of the other independent variables and can increase the 
variance of the regression coefficients (Forthofer et al., 2007). VIF of the explanatory 
variables are more effective when determining relations between independent variables 
due to the detection of more subtle forms of multicollinearity (Forthofer et al., 2007). The 
VIF of an explanatory variable indicates the strength of the linear relationship between 
the variable and the remaining explanatory variables (Forthofer et al., 2007). VIFs less 
than 10 are generally accepted (Forthofer et al., 2007).  
The assumption of multicollinearity was tested using the collinearity diagnostic 
output from SPSS, VIF. Statistical output indicated a high level of multicollinearity was 
present for the ACO size (VIF = 874.87), incentive size (VIF = 53.21), aged 85 and older 
(VIF = 33.96) and males (VIF = 803.93). The remaining five covariate VIF values were 
below 10. These VIF values are duplicated for all dependent variables in their original 
form, thus this assumption is violated for all research questions. Box-Cox transformation 





Figure 1. Acute care readmissions correlation (unstandardized predicted value). 
Post Transformation 
The normality and multicollinearity violations support a conversion of DV data 
using a Box-Cox transformation and changes to some covariate scales. Statistic 
transformation was completed in XLSTAT Excel. Several plug-ins were attempted to 
rectify SPSS issues in producing the Box-Cox transformation, thus an alternative 
software program was needed to generate conversion. The generated transformed data 




Shapiro-Wilk normality test was performed on the transformed readmission variable 
dataset in SPSS. The Shapiro-Wilk pretransformation and posttransformation normality 
test results are compared in Table 3. With the presence of heteroscedasticity identified in 
the initial scatter plot and then verified by the results of the White test, the residuals 
plotted yielded a linear relationship after transforming the acute care readmissions 
variable data (Figure 2). 
The findings in Table 3 indicate that the distribution of data is borderline normal. 
However, a Box-Cox transformation was done to improve the normality of the sampled 
variable. In the Box-Cox transformation, a lambda value of 0.5 was applied. Table 4 
shows the outcome of this transformation that produced a stronger transformed variable 
distribution of the acute readmissions rate.  
Table 3 
 
       Test of Normality for Acute Care Readmission Pre-& Post Transformation 
 
  
 Shapiro-Wilk Pre   Shapiro-Wilk Post 
Statistic   Sig.   Statistic   Sig. 
 













a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 A transformation of the readmissions rate variable adjusted the data distribution 
of residuals, which are linearly represented in Figure 2. Outliers observed in Figure 1 
prompted additional statistical evaluation, thus the correlating z-score was calculated. A 
total of five outliers were removed and the normality assumption was met. A scatter plot 




transformation and adjustment to variable dataset, there is no linearity violation. 
According to Figure 1, only mild outliers are presented in this variable dataset prior to 
transformation. Table 3 statistically confirms the weak significance found in the scatter 
plot depicted in Figure 1. Outliers are also a threat to the validity of the results of a 
multiple linear regression. The Cook’s distance (Cook’s D) statistical test was applied the 
acute care readmission variable. Cook’s D is used to determine how much influence the 
predictor variable (incentive size), covariate, has on the dependent variables (outpatient 
ED visits, acute care readmissions, per capita expenditures) or outcomes. Outliers can 
place undue influence on the explanatory variable.  
In an effort to correct not meeting the assumptions of multiple linear regression, 
outliers were removed from the variable data. Cook’s distance was plotted with acute 
readmission rate visually showing a distinct outlier then based on the residual statistic 
output  the minimum and maximum of Cook’s distance was obtained (.000, 11.461); after 
this process the data was transformed to provide compliance of assumptions of the 
readmissions rate (i.e., DV). The conversion of the number of participants who were 
disabled, ages 85+, male, African American, and Hispanic to percentages addressed 
multicollinearity. Each variable identified as a number/rate was divided by ACO size and 
multiplied by 100 to determine the percentage. Another variable of concern is ACO size 
because of an extreme VIF value pre-transformation. To reduce multicollinearity, ACO 
size was broken into 3 groups, converting the scale from nominal to ordinal:  
 Group value 1 = 0 – 8500 MSSP ACO participating beneficiaries  




 Group value 3 = 22501 + MSSP ACO participating beneficiaries 
 Through grouping of the ACO dataset, VIFs were recalculated after the 
conversion of the disabled, Hispanic, African American, ages 85+, and males from 
absolute numbers to percentages. The post transformation output of the collinearity 
diagnostics indicate that VIF values were less than 10 for all variables, these values 
ranged from 1.068 (critical access hospitals) to 1.973 (ACO size groups). The assumption 
of multicollinearity was met for acute readmission rates, ED visits, and per capita 
expenditures dependent variables with control variables tested.  
After applying the Box-Cox transformation to the acute care readmissions rate 
dataset, heteroscedasticity remains present. As per the design and scope of the study, the 






Note. Readmissions rate: DV 
Figure 2. Transformed; P-P plot of regression standardized residual. 
The assumption of linearity was met according to Figure 2 and Table 3 with the 
transformed data applied. The scatter plot shows a stronger linear relationship. Figure 2 
shows a fit line showing the measures of dispersion distribution of the transformed data, 
acute care readmission variable, meeting the linearity assumption for Research Question 
1. The conversion of covariate datasets indicate that after transformation the 




ABtotBnchmk data variable, dividing values by 1 million to convert data aligning beta 
with confidence intervals. 
Multiple Linear Regression 
The model summary and ANOVA results generated for Research Question 1 
(readmission rates) with controls are R
2
 = .369, F (9, 336) = 21.848, p < .000; 36.9% of 
the variance can be explained by the predictors. Unstandardized beta values, standard 
error, and their respective significance level are indicated in Table 3. The data shows that 
incentive size (p = .010), the disabled (p < .000), critical access hospitals (p = .022), ages 
85 + (p < .000), African American (p < .000) and Hispanic (p < .000) and the disabled (p 
< .000) significantly contribute to predicting readmission rates. Corresponding beta 
values were positive for the above-mentioned significant variables. There was no 
influence found from males, ACO size groups, or ETA hospitals on acute care 





Table 4  
Incentive Prediction of Acute Readmissions with Controls   











      95% CI     
 
   p 
      
Incentive size (dollar 




ACO size groups .082 -.061 [-.222, .100] .458 
Percentage of 





beneficiaries aged 85+ .015 .123 
 
[.094, .151] < .000
 
Percentage of Males .022 .034 [-.010, .079] .126 
Percentage of African 









hospitals  .012 -.027 
[-.050, -.004] 
  .022 
Electing teaching 
amendment hospitals  
 
.099 .042 [-.152, .236] .067 
 Note.  N = 343. 
 a. Predictor: (Constant), incentive size 
 b. DV: transformed and rescaled acute readmissions rates per 1000 
            c. Covariates: aged 85+, ACO size groups, males, Hispanic and African  
     American races, CAHs, ETA hospitals, disabled   
Research Question 2: Incentive Size and Emergency Department  
The assumption of linearity, homoscedasticity, and outliers are examined visually 
through the scatter plot in Figure 3. Figure 3 gives a visual presentation of the dataset and 
suggests a non-linear relationship, additionally showing the presence of outliers and 
heteroscedasticity. Each assumption was further tested using a variety of appropriate 




assumptions through statistical tests provide validation of the model fit. The Shapiro-
Wilk normality test yielded the results outlined in Table 5. These findings indicate 
nonnormality of the dataset. As seen in Figure 3, the assumption of homoscedasticity is 
concluded by performing White’s test. Findings revealed that p = .005, thus rejecting 
homoscedasticity and accepting the alternative hypothesis of heteroscedasticity for this 
dependent variable, the risk of a type I error is less than 0.51%. Box-Cox transformation 
will correct for violation of linearity and normality. 
Multicollinearity of the 3 dependent variables was examined by reviewing the 
VIF. Tests for multicollinearity, as noted prior, indicate high levels of collinearity is 
present for the ACO size (VIF = 874.87), incentive size (VIF = 53.21), those 85 and older 
(VIF = 33.956) and males (VIF = 803.929), the remaining five covariate VIF values were 
below 10, R
2 
= .470, p < .000, F (9,347) = 33.24. Outliers were examined visually and 
statistically equated via SPSS. Cook’s D test was used to locate potential outliers. Cook’s 
D gave the value of 13.932, suggesting a violation of the outlier assumption when testing 





Figure 3. ED visit multivariate correlation with unstandardized predicted values. 
Prior to transformation, the Durbin-Watson value was calculated for Research 
Question 2 at 1.994 for the multiple regression tests, indicating a solid fit of the model 
with no violation of independence. The test for normality of the data for outpatient ED 
visits are detailed in Table 5 prior to transformation, indicating a violation of normality. 
Findings are also provided in Figure 3, output support the need for data transformation 
given the significance level, both normality and linearity assumptions were not met 




violations of the assumptions, the dataset for ED visits were transformed using a Box-
Cox calculation in SPSS. Figure 4 provides a histogram of the transformed dataset. A 
lambda of -0.16 was used in the Box-Cox calculation transformation. The converted 
dataset for the variable showed a successful conversion as seen in Table 8 and Figure 4.  
Table 5 
        
Test of Normality for Outpatient ED Visits Pre-& Post Transformation 
 
  
Shapiro-Wilk Pre    Shapiro-Wilk Post 













a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Posttransformation  
Upon transformation of the ED visit variable, the sample distribution is linear in 
Figure 4; therefore the linearity assumption is not violated. A normality test for RQ2 
provided a level of significance in the distribution of the data after the transformation 







Note. ED visits: DV 
Figure 4. Transformed without outliers; P-P plot of regression standardized residual. 
Table 5 shows that the normality assumption is met post transformation. Cook’s 
D minimum and maximum are .000 and 51.419 respectively. Z-scores were then 
calculated in SPSS and four outliers with z-scores of +/-3.29 were removed in response to 
the Cook’s D value. The VIF values, are as noted, in the post transformation section for 
acute care readmissions; multiple changes to the variables occurred, including converting 




previously discussed. After the changes to this dataset, a VIF was rerun and showed no 
collinearity of the variables; hence the assumption of multicollinearity was met.  After 
applying the Box-Cox transformation to the outpatient ED visit dataset, 
heteroscedasticity remains present. As per the design and scope of the study, the violation 
of the homoscedastic assumption is violated and considered a limitation of the study.  
Multiple Linear Regression 
Incentive predictions of the rate of outpatient ED visits as hypothesized in 
Research Question 2 yielded R
2
 = .593, F (9, 335) = 54.264, p < .000 in linear regression 
testing. Table 10 shows the predictor variables that tested significant, these include those 
aged 85+ (p < .000), the disabled (p < .000), and African Americans (p = .001) 
participating in the MSSP. The negative beta values indicate an inverse relationship 
between the statistically significant predictors and outcome variables; as the percentage 
of those aged 85+ and the disabled increase in ACO’s, outpatient ED visits decrease by 
the listed beta coefficient value. Table 6 provides a comparison of the beta values and 





ED Visits   Unstandardized  
 
 SE β 95% CI  p 










ACO size groups .001 .001 
 
[-.000176, .003] .081 
Percentage of Disabled .000073 -.001 
 
[-.001, -.001] < .000
 
Percentage of beneficiaries 
aged 85+ .000151 -.001 
 
 
[-.001, -.001] < .000
 





[-.001, .000364] .726 
Percentage of African 









[-.000235, .000293] .827 
Critical access hospitals  .000116 -.000193 
 
[-.000421, .000035] .097 
Electing teaching 
amendment hospitals  
.001 .000227 
 
[-.002, .002] .817 
          
 
Note.   N = 344. 
 a. Predictor: (constant), incentive size 
            b. DV: transformed and rescaled ED visits  
            c. Covariates: aged 85+, ACO size groups, males, Hispanic and African American 
     races, CAHs, ETA hospitals, disabled  
Research Question 3: Incentive Size and Per Capita Expenditures 
 A Durbin-Watson value of 1.816 was identified for the multiple linear regression 
test indicating there is no violation of independence in the correlation of per capita 
expenditures and predictor variables. The linearity assumption is not met based on the 
results seen in Figure 5. The per capita variable presents as non-normal in the Shapiro-
Wilk normality test, significance is calculated as .000 (> 0.05) when testing the original 
dataset. The normality assumption is not met. In Figure 5, heteroscedasticity is present, 
Table 6  
Incentive Prediction of ED Visits with Controls  






validated by the White test results, p= .004 with less than a .45% of type I error 
occurring. The assumption is not met; heteroscedasticity is present. 
Figure 5. Per capita expenditure correlation with incentive size. 
Lastly, the test of multicollinearity is examined using the VIF diagnostics. These 
are identical to the previous two DVs, output identifies high levels of multicollinearity 
was present for the ACO size (VIF = 874.87), incentive size (VIF = 53.21), those 85 and 




were below 10. Overall, there is a need to align these variables to meet the assumptions 
of the multiple linear regression tests.  
PostTransformation  
A Box-Cox transformation was performed and produced different measures of 
significance per normality test. The Shapiro-Wilk’s normality test (post transformation) 
yielded a significant outcome for the variable’s normality. The normality assumption is 
considered significant if it is larger than .05 (Table 7). A lambda of -0.5 was applied to 
the data transformation shifting the data values. 
 
Table 7 
        
Test of Normality for Per Capita Expenditures – Pre and Post Transformation 
 
  
Shapiro-Wilk Pre    Shapiro-Wilk Post 
Statistic   Sig.   Statistic   Sig. 
  
Per capita  
 
.792 









a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 The variable’s dispersion in Figure 6 show that the converted data yielded a 
normal distribution of the variables standardized residuals. As seen in Figure 6, the 
linearity assumption is met. Cook’s D post transformation values (.000, 51.419) indicate 
there are undue influences by the outliers to the regression line even with the removal 








Note. Per capita expenditure: DV 
Figure 6. Posttransformation; P-P plot of regression standardized residual. 
 After the conversion of this dataset, multicollinearity statistics, VIF’s were rerun 
to show no collinearity of the variables, hence the assumption of multicollinearity is met.  
After applying the Box-Cox transformation to the per capita expenditure dataset, 
heteroscedasticity remains present. As per the design and scope of the study, the violation 




Multiple Linear Regression  
The final multivariate regression performed tested the per capita expenditures of 
aged non-dual assigned beneficiaries predicted by incentive size and the additional 
covariates. The results identify R
2
 =.317, F (9, 333) = 16.59, p < .000. These findings 
indicate that incentive size, males, ages 85+, ACO size, African Americans and Hispanic 
races participating in the MSSP make a significant contribution when predicting per 
capita spending. Incentive size, male, African American and Hispanic races’ beta values 
indicate an inverse relationship between these predictor variables and per capita 
expenditures of the ACO beneficiaries. Thirty-one percent of the variance in per capita 






Per Capita Expenditures   Unstandardized   
 SE     β  
95% CI 
 p 












ACO size groups .000067 .000140 
 
[.000008, .000272] .038 
Percentage of Disabled .000006 -5.08E
-6 
 
[-.000017, .000007] .400 
Percentage of beneficiaries 
aged 85+ .000014 -.000144 
 
 
[-.000171, -.000181] <.000 
Percentage of Males .000019 -5.42E
-5 
 
[-.000091, -.000017] .004 





[-.000027, -.000010] <.000 
Percentage of Hispanics .000012 -3.28E
-6 
 
[-.000056, -.000010] .006 
Critical access hospitals  .000009 1.08E
-5 
 
[-.000008, .000029] .248 
Electing teaching 





[-.001, .001] .904 
          
 
Note  N = 343. 
 a. Predictor: (constant), incentive size 
            b. DV: transformed and rescaled per capita expenditures  
            c. Covariates: aged 85+, ACO size groups, males, Hispanic and African  
American races, CAHs, ETA hospitals, disabled  
Four of nine covariates in the regression analysis of Research Question 3 
coefficients were significant with inverse relationships. Inverse predictors include 
incentive size, males, African Americans and Hispanic races, these predictors have 
negative relationships with the outcome variable and per capita expenditures. The 
negative beta-values indicate an inverse relationship between the statistically significant 
Table 8 
Incentive Prediction of Per Capita Expenditures with Controls  
   
 






predictor and outcome variables. As incentive size and the percentage of males, African 
Americans, and Hispanics increase in ACOs, the expenditures per capita decrease by the 
listed beta coefficient value in Table 7. The null hypothesis was rejected. 
Summary 
This chapter provides results of the statistical analyses of predictability of 
incentive size on ACO performance of Medicare beneficiaries participating in the MSSP. 
Findings include a significant predictive relationship for two of the three dependent 
variables tested after transformation of the three DV datasets. The null hypothesis was 
rejected for Research Questions 1 and 3 after datasets were transformed, scale 
adjustments and outliers were removed to meet assumptions.  
Results of multiple regression tests indicate that there is a relationship between 
incentive size and acute care readmission rates, as well as per capita expenditures for 
non-dual aged beneficiaries, when controlling for ACO size, the disabled, males, those 
aged 85+, African Americans and Hispanics, use of Method II critical access hospitals 
and electing teaching amendment hospitals participating with MSSP under an ACO.  
In testing Research Question 1, results show that incentive size, F (9, 336) = 
21.848, β = .001, p = .010 and six covariates, the disabled β = .041, p < .000, African 
American β = .027, p < .000 and Hispanic β = .053, p < .000 races, critical access 
hospital β = -.027, p = .022 and aged 85+ β = .123, p < .000 were significant predictors of 
acute readmission rates. Analysis of Research Question 2 showed that incentive size F (9, 
336) = 54.264, β = -5.057E
-6
, p = .085 failed to predict outpatient ED visit frequency, 




shows that in addition to incentive size F (9, 336) = 16.590, β = -6.275E
-7
, p = .009 five 
covariates ACO size groups β = .000140, p= .038, aged 85+ β = - .000144, p < .000), 
African American β = -1.825E
-5
, p < .000, Hispanic β = -3.28E10
-5
, p = .006, and males β 
= -5.417E
-5
, p = .004 are significant contributors in predicting per capita spending.  
In chapter 5, I will present an in-depth discussion and analysis of the results 
presented in this chapter. Within the context and scope of the study’s supporting 
literature, the results will be presented in alignment with the research questions posed. 
Political and regulatory implications, as well as recommendations will be presented with 





Chapter 5: Discussion and Interpretation of Results 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the predictive relationship between the 
incentive size of the MSSP and acute care readmissions rates, ED visits, and per capita 
expenditures. I used secondary data in this study, and the eight covariates represented 
disease severity contributing to clinical vulnerability, socioeconomic characteristics 
linked to health disparities, and hospital affiliation in the MSSP PUF. The results of this 
study indicated that incentive size positively predicts acute readmission rates and 
negatively predicts per capita spending measuring performance in participating MSSP 
ACOs slightly. Provider performance and incentives are difficult to align, placing quality 
at risk. Financial incentives can affect health outcomes, spending patterns, access to 
appropriate care, treatment- and service behavior-based options, medication selection, 
readmission rates, and per capita expenditures.  
A complex network of ACO alignments are needed to fully evolve the nation’s 
health care delivery system. The scope of this study was focused on the MSSP ACO 
team-based approach to concentric performance when influenced by financial incentive 
size while controlling for confounding variables. The emerging themes generated from 
the existing literature combined ACO performance and incentive size through incentive 
design and operational infrastructure. The findings from this study show correlations 
between the predictor and outcome variables when controlling for variables representing 





Interpretation of Findings 
The results presented in Chapter 4 provided statistical support of data 
interpretation when controlling for the confounding variables of the study. The 
predictability of incentive size was the IV in the multiple linear regression analysis. 
Outcomes of the multiple linear regression analysis showed incentive size being a 
significant predictor of increased readmission rates and smaller per capita expenditures 
with no predictability of incentive size on ED outpatient visit rates.  
Acute Care Readmissions 
I found a significant association between ACO MSSP value-based incentive size 
and acute care readmission rates in this study. ACO performance was measured in part by 
acute care readmission rates, and the findings indicated a single unit increase of the 
financial incentive size, increased acute readmission rates by 7.637 (β = 7.637). Existing 
financial incentives induce poor performance by increasing the frequency of acute care 
readmissions, resulting in expensive inpatient hospital visits and expenditures 
The findings for Research Question 1 contradicted the results of other studies in 
the literature studying financial incentive-driven savings generating a reduction in 
readmissions (McWilliams et al., 2013; Scott et al, 2016). Most variables studied in the 
literature reviewed by Scott et al. (2016) differed such as reimbursement methodology, 
APM program type, and incentive size. It can be implied that a robust incentive size fails 
to motivate providers to modify their treatment behavior, showing a need to improve the 
coordination of care for MSSP beneficiaries in the ACO setting. Colla et al.’s (2016) 




NIH perceived them as aged (65 years old and older) and disabled (IOM, 1996). The 
uncoordinated care of clinically vulnerable patients raises readmission rates among 20% 
of the Medicare population (Colla et al., 2016). The ACO setting relies on an alignment 
of coordinated care among multiple specialties and providers, collaborating to provide 
effective and responsive care. Within the MSSP model, incentives are provided as 
motivation to accomplish this. Colla et al.’s findings support the recommendation of the 
use of standard clinical processes targeting the chronically ill and the expenses this 
subpopulation generates through avoidable readmissions. The reviewed literature is 
consistent and aligns with the findings that this subpopulation consumes more costs and 
resources in delivering care to the MSSP population. Reduced readmission rates suggest 
an improved ACO performance. These results suggested that targeted services should be 
developed and provided to these populations to further reduce and avoid future 
readmissions.  
Colla et al. (2017) studied the Pioneer and Shared Saving ACO programs, 
tracking total spending per quarter in their study. My findings in this study shared three 
overlapping variables with the study conducted by Colla et al. These variables were 30-
day readmission rate, ED visits, and per capita spending in absolute dollars. The findings 
of Colla et at. (2017) aligned with my Research Question 3 results. Overall per capita 
spending decreased with ACO contractual obligation, showing approximately three times 
the savings in the clinically vulnerable or those with higher disease severity (Colla et al., 
2017). The findings for Research Question 2 also aligned because incentives 




results and ED visit frequency decreased by 1.3 events for all Medicare beneficiaries. 
Colla et al. found an increase in acute care readmission rates (i.e., Research Question 1) 
in studied ACOs but failed to consider ACO size or hospital affiliation which I included 
in my study. Colla et al. noted these factors may in part subscribe to ACO success, and in 
both studies, universal quality processes of team disease management were identified as 
contributors to future ACO success.  
Collectively, the literature is dependent on the strength of the contractually 
defined MSSP incentive size and statistically supported the prediction of readmissions as 
a source of health care expenditures (Conrad, 2015).  These components ultimately 
impact the MSSP and ACO performance (Conrad, 2015). By providing aligned 
contractual arrangements with incentive size and quality benchmarks, accountable 
performance improves by reducing per capita expenditures and adhering to the program 
requirements. 
The results of this study failed to align with those of Evan and Demko (2015) and 
Nyweide et al. (2015) on the ACO Pioneer program. Both of these studies applied a fee-
for-service payment methodology as opposed to the MSSP. These researchers found that 
financial incentives reduced acute care readmissions and the use of multiple health 
services, including the ED, unlike the present study (see Denko, 2015; Nyweide et al., 
2015). However, according to McWilliams et al. (2015), a balanced value of financial 
incentives are needed. Based on the VBPIT, if the incentive is overly strong, it would 
diminish the shared savings component; however, it will support additional savings 




with larger incentives leveling out and presenting an adverse reaction to performance as 
described in the VBPIT (Conrad, 2015). The results of my study in conjunction with 
those of existing literature show the potential to misalign the value of the incentive, 
compromising quality of care impacting ACO performance and provider treatment 
behavior benchmarked by CMS.  
Researchers have suggested that strong, competitive, larger incentive sizes will 
sufficiently motivate ACO provider teams to improve ACO performance by reducing 
acute care readmissions and increasing the savings potential of the ACO, contrary to 
statistical findings (Conrad & Perry, 2009; Ouayogode et al., 2017). Defining the 
incentive size of ACO performance rewards may inform the expansion of existing MSSP 
contracts to enforce consistent and concentric care at the ACO level (Conrad, 2015). 
However, meaningful measures of quality are linked to incentive size by the CMS, where 
ACO incentives must be balanced in size to effectively reduce acute care readmission, 
further contributing to a reduction in expenditures per beneficiary (CMS, 2017). 
Alignment between incentive remuneration and performance benchmarks may alter the 
behavior of the provider and ACO team positively.  
Competitive incentive size contributed to the ACO provider team adherence to 
CMS-defined benchmarks in a balanced incentive payment strategy linked to ACO 
performance (Fisher et al., 2012). Fisher et al. (2012) also tested the early implementation 
of ACOs, capturing outcomes inclusive of incentive size structure most likely to 
influence ACO operational decisions on performance and its measurement in any ACO 




focused on the concept of loss aversion, assuming the fear of returning or losing the 
advance motivates the performance (Conrad, 2015). Contrary to the loss aversion 
component of Conrad’s (2015) VBPIT, the program studied was without the ability to 
test this concept as it did not offer monetary penalties.  
Existing literature also showed that when risk-adjustment strategies are applied, 
they provide a competitive operational incentive size as part of the reformed incentive. 
Application of risk-adjustment strategies contributed to a level of incentive neutrality, 
where incentive size plays a predictive role (Conrad, 2015; Larson et al., 2012; Torchiana 
et al., 2013; Williams et al., 2013). The MGPO quality incentive program tested 130 
quality measures, considerably more than the 33 quality measures outlined by CMS on 
ACO APM rewards, to determine a range of variables tied to quality and safety 
improvements not just incentive size (Torchiana et al., 2013). These results did not have 
an impact on provider behavior and there was minimal incentive value (i.e., 2%) in the 
MGPO incentive program-linked specific benchmarks. Nyweide et al. (2015) published 
study findings that indicated that increased follow-up care for those admitted, but 
recently discharged, will contribute to lower readmission rates and reduce costs 
associated with readmission (Williams et al., 2013). The findings of my study revealed 
that the reduction in expenditures was attributed to a decrease in resource use among this 
population, without influence of the incentive size to reduce acute readmission rates. 
Colla et al. (2014) showed that streamlined clinical processes improved ACO 
performance, contributing to a decline in readmissions and in ED visits; both variables 




Emergency Department (ED) Visits 
In this study, I failed to find a relationship between incentive size and outpatient 
ED visits for MSSP ACOs. The results of the multiple linear regression tests in this study 
showed no statistically significant association between incentive size and the number of 
ED visits. Incentive size did not contribute significantly in reducing the frequency of ED 
visits. However, the findings showed that a negative relationship exists between the 
covariates and recognizing clinical vulnerability with elevated disease severity, those 
aged 85 years old and older (β = -.001), and the disabled (β = -.001) with the incentive 
size, the predictor. As incentive size increases, these covariates decrease slightly. This 
finding suggests a reduced use of health care resources, ultimately contributing to lower 
per capita expenditures (i.e., the focus of Research Question 3) associated with care for 
the Medicare subpopulation.  
Kaufman, Spivack, Stearns, Song, and O’Brien (2017) compared private and 
public ACO influence on health outcomes, resource usage, and clinical processes. The 
results of their study showed that ACOs lowered inpatient hospital care usage, thus 
reducing ED visits and ultimately health expenditures. These findings aligned with the 
findings of this study in regard to per capita spending, yet contradicted the ED visit DV. 
In previous research, inconsistent contract structure caused a lack of support on an ACOs 
effect of clinical processes linked to health outcomes.  
Nyweide et al. (2015) found that with the reduced use of ED services, 
expenditures naturally declined. However, based on the results of this dissertation, 




ACOs have more contractual viability with the capability to negotiate prices and apply 
benchmarks, encouraged by incentives, leading to slower spending growth and increased 
quality (Song et al., 2014). Song et al. (2014) implied that ACO contracts with strong 
incentives may elicit changes in provider decision-making behavior in a private ACO 
setting. Findings of Research Question 2 supports recent literature results that once a 
benchmark is in place, financial incentive infrastructure has the potential to strengthen 
provider participation in incentive driven savings (Colla et al., 2016; Rose et al., 2016; 
Song et al., 2014). 
Per Capita Expenditures 
This dissertation’s RQ3 findings show a significant inverse (β = -6.275) 
predictive association between the MSSP value-based incentive size and the total 
performance year spending per ACO Medicare beneficiaries, defined as the per capita 
expenditures. As incentive size increases the per capita spending lowers by 6.275 units. 
The ACO’s subpopulations per capita expenditures of health services were negatively 
predicted by incentive size, indicating that higher incentives will help to control per 
capita spending. Provider decision-making behavior is motivated by adequate incentive 
size and reduces expenditures. Coordination of care is encouraged by ACO MSSP 
incentive size in my study, as it relates to ACO performance and is noted in other 
research to be vital in responding to Medicare beneficiaries with five or more chronic 
conditions e.g. disease severity (Colla et al., 2015).  
ACO performance of coordinated care also contributes to less costly care for this 




of the research by Colla et al. (2016) are consistent with this dissertation’s research 
results, that contracted benchmarks are applied to generate cost restraint of per capita 
expenditures. Equivalent research shows a decrease in spending for the MSSP 
beneficiaries labeled as clinically vulnerable with higher disease severity, savings were 
primarily generated by reducing ED visits and hospital admissions. Several studies report 
that applying ACO Medicare APM programs made substantial reductions in ED visits, 
lowering spending (Colla et al., 2016; Nyweide et al., 2015; McWilliams et al., 2015). 
This finding is not supported by the results of this dissertation.  
ACOs have the ability to align incentive size and performance, resulting in 
controlled spending. By using contractual benchmarks, such as those applied to Medicare 
ACOs in Massachusetts’s private and public programs, ACOs are held accountable for 
delivering universal quality of care working towards contained costs and reduced 
spending beyond year 1 of these programs (Ouayogode et al., 2017; Rose et al., 2016; 
Song et al., 2014). Literature states that savings for these organizations have been 
exhausted by Year 2 of federal programs, forcing the industry to look closer at where and 
how savings can be generated.  
As shown in this dissertation, saving opportunities may revolve around improved 
incentive-driven processes of care that surround disease severity. According to Rose et al. 
(2016), if the existing benchmark structure is dissolved for CMS ACOs, a reformulated 
and more effective incentive strengthens the goals of the programs. The methodology of 




revised, predetermined benchmark in the Medicare ACO programs produces significant 
savings.  
Literature on the strength of the applied financial incentive supports both 
influence and non-influence to performance. Song et al. (2014) found no supportive 
evidence to suggest that savings could continue beyond Year 2 of implementation with 
no regulatory or program reform. My model could improve if a longitudinal study was 
performed comparing data from 2015 to 2018, new revisions of ACO models now 
include a Year 3 component which may support the findings for a more motivationally-
balanced incentive size without compromising provider behavior. However, the research 
did report usable results in terms of incentive effectiveness, which is further supported by 
results produced in a study by Joynt Maddox et al. (2017). Federal programs have 
operational structures and formats that differ, including incentive size and incentive 
structure. The MSSP incentive structure does not apply penalties to performance, only 
bonuses. The benchmarks used to determine these bonuses are also under scrutiny. These 
benchmarks often fail to measure true provider-behavior in delivering health care as they 
only compare the ACOs performance to its performance of the previous year, thereby 
generating more incentive payouts than savings without loss aversion occurring.    
Revision of similar programs will begin the transformation of concepts applying 
transparency in treatment behavior and accountability in delivering universal quality in a 
concentric format of care. Data suggested the lack of saving opportunities where 
incentives are larger than the savings return will produce an ineffective and failed 




motivating baseline penalties in the MSSP, using a sliding incentive reward scale, with a 
comparable sliding penalty scale (Joynt Maddox et al., 2017).  
Value based payment incentive theoretical foundation. Behavioral economics 
implies that provider motivation is influenced by financial incentives. A more 
competitive incentive size can substitute extrinsic for intrinsic provider motivation 
thereby improving ACO performance with balanced incentive size and quality 
benchmarks. It is important to provide risk-adjusted penalties for failures in meeting 
quality specific performance measures as per the behavioral economic component of this 
dissertation. These benchmarks are defined by CMS. According to the VBPIT, the use of 
penalties will further encourage the desired behavior more so than rewards alone, 
contradictory of the MSSP studied. This suggests that accountability with pre-set 
benchmarks. Presently the MSSP APM does not penalize ACOs and uses relative 
benchmarks. Relative benchmarks are bonus-based only, as per concerns of loss aversion 
(Conrad, 2015; Joynt Maddox, Samson, Zuckerman, DeLew, & Epstein, 2017).  
Conrad (2015) additionally theorizes that behavioral changes are supported by a 
common or shared interest in the outcome applied through contractual arrangements per 
the principal-agent component of the VBPIT present in the MSSP arrangement. With 
robust incentive sizes, ACO performance will improve, but only with the use of 
contractual agreements. Shifting incentivized rewards to those with a shared interest in 
ACO performance leads to improved quality and ACO provider team accountability. The 
VBPIT supports the introduction of a moderate penalty applied to ACOs not meeting pre-




There is much debate on motivation. Layton and Ryan (2015) contradict the 
applied theory in this dissertation. Their findings show that incentive size did not play a 
part in impacting improvements of performance. The VBPIT suggests a robust and 
competitive incentive be applied; however, penalties will elicit a stronger response by 
providers given the loss-aversion concept (Conrad, 2015). This dissertation links ACO 
performance measures to both use of resources with the clinically vulnerable and hospital 
services. According to Franco (2015), existing literature provides a platform for the 
development of incentive aligned clinical standards, which is also supported by the 
VBPIT, guiding the ability to link clinical practice improvement activities providing 
uniformity to the processes of care.  
Aligning ACO performance will be difficult to achieve as the VBPIT indicates 
that providers are incentivized stronger with individually induced incentives, which is 
operationally opposite of the ACOs concept of care (Conrad, 2015). Team incentives 
would additionally be supported by the behavioral economic component in the VBPIT of 
defined incentives, but subsequent to the allocation of incentive reinvestment into the 
ACO to improve quality to be determined by the ACO administration, involving the 
providers in this decision will ensure behavior alignment. There has been much debate on 
the effectiveness of penalties versus rewards in driving provider motivation and decision-
making behavior. Conrad (2015) theorized that competitively sized rewards aimed 
toward the provider will help to produce the level of engagement desired; however, the 




Findings of this dissertation assert that ACO provider team behaviors are 
motivated by a competitively sized financial incentive that must be contractually bound 
and linked to low or moderate risk of penalties through the use of pre-set performance 
benchmarks compared to relative performance measures (Conrad, 2015; Joynt Maddox et 
al., 2017). The behavioral economic component of the VBPIT requires these measures to 
have a direct connection to a provider’s clinical decision-making ability. Accountable 
quality benchmark measures indicate quantifiable performance of the provider and is not 
based on measures “out of the providers” control. This theoretically suggests that 
providers are individually motivated by controllable health outcomes. With emerging 
ACO strategies, financial incentive motivation must capture all caregivers in the ACO 
setting, a setting where the VBPIT has not been tested in to date (Conrad, 2015). 
Strategies of the VBPIT aim to improve preventive care and team-based responses linked 
to CMS ACO incentive rewards through relative performance measures and hefty 
influential incentive bonuses. Incentivized bonuses will reduce the use of limited and 
costly resources contributing to lower overall expenditures. 
 Social implications. The social implications of this dissertation include policy 
reform of regulations surrounding incentive-based reward systems of federal health 
delivery programs, theoretically supported contractual changes outlined by robust 
incentivized rewards with penalty implicating benchmarks in place, and to impact policy 
needs to regulate the process of care in response to the beneficiary’s health needs. These 
social implications culminate to provide a path to improved quality of care, more 




dissertation have important social change implications related to the country’s emerging 
APM strategies and the political regulations that manage them. Inferences in this research 
are total per capita expenditures and acute care readmission rates are found to be 
predicted by financial incentives contributing to ACO performance.  
The implications of these findings contribute to strategic development of quality 
assurance and cost saving measures made possible through aligned contractual 
arrangements, a theoretically supported component of a successful ACOs’ performance 
(Conrad, 2015). Contractual financial incentive reform can lead to implementing a 
baseline incentive, with the potential to earn more by using a more competitive incentive 
to motivate quality-based ACO provider team performance, and by applying an alternate 
strategy of pre-set benchmark values to further lower readmissions rates while assisting 
in balancing a savings through incentive rewards.  
By incentivizing MSSP care delivered, targeting the chronically ill and 
beneficiaries with more complex health conditions, ACO performance will improve. 
There is advanced promotion of social change through health care reform of ACO 
incentive supported operational strategies built to motivate provider behavior to improve 
performance. With the shift of both private and public payers to a value-based episode 
framed reward system of care, ACO incentive programs are evolving as information on 
the effectiveness of APM’s use of incentives to modify and guide patient care generated 
from earlier implemented MSSP tracks.  
The ACO has sparked a wave of supporting policy that follows core health goals 




private insurance sectors as a means to produce a consistent level of quality care to the 
insured. This value-based incentive model assesses performance at multiple levels and 
evaluates categories of that include quality of care, resource utilization, and clinical 
practice improvement activities (Franco, 2015). These incentive models are also expected 
to produce needed improvements that align performance goals with incentive size. These 
results can inform policymakers and insurance analysts that a motivating incentive size 
can enhance ACO performance by modifying provider behavior and using team 
coordinated care reinforced by reducing per capita spending. 
Provider treatment and service patterns of care can be modified through the use of 
incentive size (Conrad, 2015; Conrad & Perry, 2009; Kaufman et al., 2017; Song et al., 
2014). Social implications are wide spread, impacting regulations surrounding the health 
care delivery process of ACOs providing care to the MSSP population. Furthermore, 
regulatory contractual changes competitively influence provider decision-making 
behavior supportive of the ACO incentives size, contributing to improved operational 
performance of federal programs. There is statistical support to implement successful 
ACO performance that can be generalized to private insurance organizations by applying 
the value-based incentive payment model. The optimal balance of incentive value can 
influence provider behavior to lower per capita expense and contribute to universal 
quality standards, producing a more streamlined, coordinated, and efficient delivery of 
care at the ACO level.  
The country’s goal is to provide improved quality of delivered health services 




may reduce expenditures of costly treatment options that fail to align with the level of 
care needed. This further reduces the nonnegotiable costs of medications leading to a less 
expensive, but equally effective medication. Elevating care calls for provider motivation 
is to make more cost-effective choices. Theoretical suggestions of shared savings can 
exist through benchmarked financial incentives, defined through contracts and with 
creative health policies that promote savings while developing a method to deliver 
consistent and concentric care.  
 Interpretation summarized. Two of the three multiple regression tests 
performed found incentive size to significantly predict acute care readmission rates and 
per capita spending of MSSP ACO population signifying performance measures. 
Suggested by other literature, but not in this dissertation, is that frequent ED visits could 
also be a public health concern with exposure to at-risk subpopulations. The failure to 
link lower acute readmission rates through incentive size supports the need for more 
defined coordinated care leading to improved quality. Patients in the 85+ age bracket and 
the disabled have multiple chronic conditions making them more susceptible to 
communicable health threats with potential for epidemic spread and elevated costs. With 
streamlined service continuity, the concept of universal quality emerges when standard 
benchmarks are incentivized, strategically improving cost effectiveness and 
reinforcement of team continuity in patient management. Per capita expenditures will 
reduce with a contributing balanced incentive size; however; this alone will not induce 




Findings of this dissertation inform policy and regulations, suggesting that 
alignment can be accomplished by modifying elements of the existing MSSP contractual 
parameters and by applying standardized universal quality supported by behavioral 
economics with effective modification of team-based incentive disbursement supported 
by robust incentives. Some literature also indicates that the fear of loss or the aversion of 
it holds a stronger influence over behavior than a reward (Joynt Maddox et al., 2017). 
Presently, MSSP is a bonus only program, findings suggest that by including a penalty 
component to the MSSP performance is expected to improve. Additionally, results of this 
study and existing literature show that a larger incentive size does not guarantee that 
ACO provider team behavior will be influenced to improve performance (Layton & 
Ryan, 2015). Regulatory and social implications lie in the implementation of a penalty 
component to the program with predetermined benchmarks, hence adjusting the current 
benchmark form that compares year to year performance measuring shared saving 
ineffectively and where providers receive incentive rewards as a result.  
Limitations 
External validity is threatened in the selection of study participants, as each 
Medicare recipient enters the program at varying levels of health. This study accounts for 
disease severity through its selection of confounding variables; however, this is 
uncontrolled when the Medicare beneficiary ACO assignment occurs. CMS considers 
only demographic factors, not health status during this process. The number of disabled 
and ACO size were two emerging confounding factors in predicting incentive size. Thus, 




conditions (five or more) and associated expenses. These were controlled in this study. 
With this knowledge, it is suggested to reduce limitations with more strategic 
considerations on ACO beneficiary assignment balancing risk-based expenditures. 
Pairing patients based on disease severity and the quantity of chronic or complex health 
conditions with ACOs that provide the specialty services are needed to provide the level 
of care defined. Controlling for disease severity in this research contributes to the validity 
of the results’ generalizability within the sampled population. 
Generalizability is weak in this study as the focus was program specific. How 
motivated behavior is guided by competitive bonuses or rewards is not generalizable 
among different incentive programs that have different incentive designs and sizes. The 
inconsistent nature of the incentive design structure remains a challenge to validate 
findings of incentive size influence on public and private ACO performance. The ACO 
setting is unique in its team-based concept, presenting difficulties in generalizing the 
findings among multiple health care settings. Socioeconomic variables were controlled in 
this dissertation, assuming their impact on costs as per the populations’ health disparities 
in race, income, and gender.  
Additionally, there is a lack of consistency in the delivery of care among this 
population. Incentivized standard processes of care may provide the ability to improve 
internal validity of the study. If Medicare applies a version of incentivized standard 
processes of care, these processes would streamline the delivery of health services in the 
ACO setting. However, this study was not all inclusive in providing insight in operational 




Research limitations regarding internal validity refer to the need to transform 
multiple dataset variables and per capita variable selection. The process of transformation 
allows for the potential compromise of the study’s internal validity. Additionally, the 
third tested dependent variable, per capita expenditures, presented a near perfect linear 
relationship with the original variable chosen to represent it in the dataset. Due to the near 
linear relationship found after statistical analyses, an alternative variable was selected, 
reducing concerns of internal validity threats. A final limitation of the study is the 
inability to transform heteroscedasticity to homoscedasticity. The proposal only outlined 
a Box-Cox transformation to convert the dataset per set parameters, therefore the 
assumption of homoscedasticity was not met. After all transformations and variable 
changes, no further limitations were encountered.  
Recommendations 
Statistical findings for Research Questions 1 and 3 show the predictability of 
incentive size on the dependent variables. This relationship existed following the 
suggested recommendations of benchmark alignment and reform, a contractually 
reformed incentive size, and a more balanced ACO beneficiary assignment process. 
There remains a struggle between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of the provider with 
many of the performance measures used to determine the incentive reward value. Based 
on study results, it is recommended that a continued investigation be conducted on the 
CMS definition of type and value of benchmarks applied, specifically benchmarks linked 
to meaningful provider and team-based tasks where outcomes are controllable by 




streamline care, which reduces rewarding mundane and expected tasks, shifting focus to 
more provider-controlled and team-specific performance measures attached to pre-
determined benchmarks inclusively motivated by financial incentives. This strategy 
rewards team-based cost containment approaches in caring for this population.  
Meaningful measures promote concentric care within a lockstep streamlined 
process of care. Findings support the need to control the rates of acute readmissions and 
per capita expenditures of the MSSP in addition to altering the rewarded quality 
benchmarks. Optimal reward size should be studied to maximize the savings, health 
improvements and coordination of care. The goal of the balanced incentive size relies in 
part on the operational design and payout structure. By designing an incentive that 
produces competitive rewards and a logical shared interest payout structure, a balance 
begins to form (Conrad, 2015).  
A suggested change to better balance reward and performance would be to apply 
a set, predetermined performance benchmark linked to financial incentive values that 
associate a risk component to an existing MSSP bonus only system. This incentive could 
adjust for performance measures that exceed the minimum benchmark presented on a 
sliding reward scale using a pre-determined benchmark not previously linked to the 
performance of value-based incentive programs, as opposed to the current MSSP 
incentive size of a flat 2% with the dual track model shifting from 2% to 3.9% (see 
Conrad, 2015; CMS, 2017a). The use of a sliding scale incentive reward would require 
research on optimal reconfiguring of the current incentive’s operational design which is 




Further research is recommended in multiple supporting areas of ACO incentive-
based performance. Outlined process of care standards and incorporation of an 
incentivizing mechanism could contribute to developing consistent quality care that 
aligns provider decision-making. However, more research is needed to determine the 
optimal cost effectiveness of applying clinical processes of care supported by enhanced 
incentive values which can collectively be applied to all ACO providers, regardless of 
assignee health status and complexity of conditions.  
Additional research is recommended to investigate the best method of ACO 
beneficiary assignment that most effectively motivates providers through a competitive 
incentive size, whereby economic risk can be more balanced, increasing opportunities to 
gain incentive rewards through performance. Accountable care organizations with higher-
risk and more cost consuming patients, including those aged 85+ and the disabled 
population with excessive chronic and complex conditions, can be more evenly 
distributed among participating ACOs. Balancing the assignment of more costly 
beneficiaries over a range of ACOs will assist in the strengthening of incentives 
applicable to operational equity and support incentive neutrality.  
Future research recommendations include the effectiveness of contractual 
arrangements outlining a more alluring incentive size as suggested by existing literature 
and the VBPIT. Based on the findings, it is expected that processes of care can be 
motivated and supported by incentive mechanisms.  Robust financial incentives and 




based performance through regulatory requirements of contractual arrangements 
universally improving quality.  
Social Change 
The social change implications of these dissertations’ findings contribute to ACO 
performance alignment of a reformed financial incentive model of motivation, 
transforming and framing provider behavior in the U.S. health care delivery system. This 
knowledge informs policy makers of a more competitive financial incentive size strategy 
to improve ACO performance. Regulatory and policy changes in the size of MSSP 
incentives may improve health care delivery, particularly with performance changes of 
the ACO providers and treatment teams. Financial incentives assist in measuring, 
monitoring, and rewarding accountable care; however, their size and form influence 
providers differently, adding to the challenge in balancing the incentive and treatment 
behavior through measures of expected performances.  
Literature suggests that an effective operational incentive size may contribute to 
motivating streamlined care through guided provider decision-making behavior. Findings 
and theories highlighted in this dissertation support the use of contractual arrangements to 
define incentive size. Social implications will directly relate to health policy changes 
surrounding incentive size, the format (percentage versus absolute dollar amount) of the 
reward and through theory based contractual applications of standard processes of care 
embedded in practice management software. 
To maximize performance of ACOs and provider program engagement, in 




recommended. By altering the existing incentives measure of performance, the year-by-
year absolute performance benchmark to predetermined benchmarks applicable to all 
MSSP ACOs performance can be initiated.  This allows financial incentives to further 
align with provider decision-making performance.  
Revised ACO programs have applied several findings of research to improve 
performance. In 2018, MSSPs have a greater balance of risk and reward embedded in the 
incentive design, as a result refined benchmarks, use of standards, and program length 
has been revised (CMS, 2018). Structurally, the MSSP initially provided a percentage-
based bonus with low risk to the providers, without penalty this program rewarded ACOs 
between 2% and 3.9% (CMS, 2016). The dissertation findings show that larger incentive 
sizes are related to ACO performance, suggesting a reevaluation of the incentive size and 
percentage format of the reward, advancing social change and affecting ACO success. All 
implications of change revolve around ensuring and elevating quality expectations of 
health care provided via MSSP.  
Conclusion 
An abundance of information can be extracted and inferred based on the statistical 
results of this dissertation. The presented information and data provide considerable 
insight on universally improved quality of care to the ACO population participating in the 
MSSP. With VBPIT support, findings show that provider care performance of an MSSP 
ACO is incentivized by a larger incentive size. While the strategic solutions to enhance 
quality, competitive costs, and affordability as it relates to access to care are complex, 




changes which are additionally sustained by economically charged actions within an 
ethical scope of care. There is a need to improve the competitiveness of incentive 
motivating alternative payment models to streamline the delivery of care at the federal 
level, supporting a concentric system of care, which is the main concept of operations of 
an ACO.  
The impact of incentivized performance is vast in cost containment which impacts 
a significant portion of the population.  In 2015, 55 million Medicare enrollees were 
participating in one of three federal incentivizing program models, of which 23.5 million 
beneficiaries are provided care under the arrangements of ACOs. There were 7.8 million 
Medicare beneficiaries receiving care under the MSSP; this study represents 
approximately 14.21% of the Medicare enrollees (Muhlestein, 2015).  
Performance benchmarks defined by CMS for ACO MSSP may not align with 
provider decision-making influenced motivation. The findings in this study suggest that 
use of a more robust incentive size with a defined absolute value in dollars, with penalties 
for not performing at the minimum benchmark, will produce improved ACO provider 
team performance. Contractual modifications can ensure robust incentive sizes, which 
can help to restructure clinical treatment, service and medication options, and narrow the 
provider decision-making to ensure consistent delivery of care.  
The goal is to reduce the use of overpriced hospital resources and prevent acute 
care readmissions, which ultimately lower expenses. All of this is done through 
responsive team-based accountable decision-making. Optimal incentive size can be 




contracts as regulation occurs at the state level, instead of federal. Incentive value is not 
the only component of the incentive model that contributes to ACO provider performance 
alignment or ACO success. Research informs the need to transform and regulate the 
format and structure of the incentive payment models, thus introducing incentive 
infrastructure changes into the public insurance sector, while contractually avoiding a 
political paradox and regulatory reform. These measures of change will guide team-based 
and provider decision-making systematically, ensuring universal quality. These strategies 
allocate the appropriate care with continuity of services applied through practice 
management software.  
The findings of this dissertation respond to the inconsistent quality of delivered 
care and non-transparent decision making in the MSSP. Competitive incentive size 
contributes to the predictability of readmission rates and per capita spending of the MSSP 
assignees. The findings of this dissertation open the window of opportunity for policy 
specific social change in the U.S. health care delivery system. This allows for 
theoretically supported measures of actions to further develop quality-focused strategies 
through the use and knowledge of this dissertation’s outcomes. Accountable care 
organization performance improves with enhanced incentive initiatives, thus revising 
operational infrastructure, alignment for stronger incentive sizes applying theoretically-
based strategies and supporting regulatory contractual alignment will sustain the nation’s 
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